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In wireless and mobile networks, handover is a complex process that involves multiple layers of
protocol and security executions. With the growing popularity of real time communication services
such as Voice of IP, a great challenge faced by handover nowadays comes from the impact of security
implementations that can cause performance degradation especially for mobile devices with limited
resources.
Given the existing networks with heterogeneous wireless access technologies, one essential research
question that needs be addressed is how to achieve a balance between security and performance
during the handover. The variations of security policy and agreement among different services and
network vendors make the topic challenging even more, due to the involvement of commercial and
social factors.
In order to understand the problems and challenges in this field, we study the properties of han-
dover as well as state of the art security schemes to assist handover in wireless IP networks. Based
on our analysis, we define a two-phase model to identify the key procedures of handover security in
wireless and mobile networks. Through the model we analyze the performance impact from existing
security schemes in terms of handover completion time, throughput, and Quality of Services (QoS).
As our endeavor of seeking a balance between handover security and performance, we propose the
local administrative domain as a security enhanced localized domain to promote the handover per-
formance. To evaluate the performance improvement in local administrative domain, we implement
the security protocols adopted by our proposal in the ns-2 simulation environment and analyze the
measurement results based on our simulation test.
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11 Introduction
Wireless and mobile technologies have reshaped our way of communication and in-
formation access in global scale. The great success of mobile industry stimulates the
public awareness of mobility and promotes the markets of Internet services to enrich
our daily lives. Nowadays, it is quite common that on our morning commuting to
school or office we start browsing the web for the latest news and weather condition,
checking personal emails, and even launching a brief chat with our friends via Voice
over IP (VoIP) service [VoI09]. With the support of advanced mobile devices includ-
ing mobile phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs) and wireless enabled laptops,
we can enjoy the Internet access almost at any time, anywhere.
For the future broadband wireless networks such as the fourth generation (4G)
networks [3GP08b], data communication will rely mainly on packet switching that
is based on the Internet Protocol (IP) [Ins81, DH98]. Multiple wireless technologies
such as GSM [GSM08], WiFi [Wi-08], and WiMAX [WiM08] utilize IP to transmit
data across the Internet. However, since IP was not originally designed to meet the
mobility requirements, there are several problems that need to be addressed before
we achieve seamless mobility in the forthcoming IP-based wireless networks.
Among the challenges posed to future IP-based wireless networks, one major is-
sue is to maintain the network connectivity for nomadic users when they migrate
from one access network to another in a mobile environment. In the context of
wireless mobility, the the procedure of switching access networks is referred to as
handover [MK04]. To support continuous connectivity and host mobility, Mobile
IP [Per02, JPA04] was proposed as a general protocol to support mobility. Regard-
ing the nomadic case, Mobile IP enables a mobile node (MN) in an IP network to
change its point of attachment, redirects data traffic to its current location, and
keeps the existing connection uninterrupted.
Although the basic mobility issue can be solved by Mobile IP, the fast develop-
ment of wireless technologies and real-time applications such as VoIP raise more
technical challenges to the mobility management. Due to the nature of wireless
communication, the coverage of communication region for each access network is
limited. During the movement across neighboring regions, handover will take place
to transfer the essential user context and service status. Because of the overhead
introduced by handover in terms of control signalling, packet redirection, and au-
thentication processing, data exchange over the existing communication session may
2suffer from unwanted packet delay or loss. For delay-sensitive real time applications,
the lengthy delay between the break of previous connection and the establishment of
new one may lead to serious performance degradation. Therefore, how to maintain
the transparency of connectivity for users who are using real-time applications has
attracted numerous research efforts from both industry and academia.
At the same time, security challenges make the handover procedure even more
complicated in a wireless and mobile environment. Unlike fixed networks, wire-
less networks are more vulnerable to malicious attacks such as eavesdropping and
data manipulation due to the vulnerability of wireless communication [BH07]. This
nature demands the adoption of security in wireless and mobile networks covering
authentication, authorization, and privacy protection. However, given that majority
of classical security mechanisms for data communication target mainly at personal
computers connected via wired networks, traditional security implementations at
current stage are insufficient to guarantee secure communication over wireless con-
nection, nor suitable for mobile devices with resource limitations in terms of com-
puting capacity and energy supply. The complexity grows hand in hand with the
ever-increasing heterogeneous networking environment. As mobile users move across
domains managed by different operators, the security schemes and policies may vary,
as well as the technologies to access the network. Given that users at different loca-
tions may demand different levels of security and different applications should also
be treated differently according their requirements, a fixed level of security can not
work for all kinds of scenarios in such a dynamic environment.
In wireless networks, authentication and authorization are necessary to secure the
user mobility. The user credentials need to be verified and validated through authen-
tication. The usage of services allowed for a particular user needs to be identified
and confirmed by authorization. Because authentication and authorization may
bring overhead and unexpected effects to mobility management, especially during
the handover phase, we need to identify and analyze their impact in wireless en-
vironment. The results will enhance our understanding of the correlation between
existing security mechanisms and different kinds of mobility schemes.
In this thesis, we analyze the handover procedure as well as the state of the art
security schemes for handover in the context of mobility management. By iden-
tifying the major factors and phases in handover security, we propose the local
administrative domain, which is a well defined mobility and security enhanced ac-
cess network to achieve a balance between the handover security and performance.
3To evaluate the performance improvement in local administrative domain, we im-
plement the authentication protocols adopted by our proposal in the ns-2 simulation
environment [NS 08], and provide preliminary measurement analysis based on our
simulation results.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview on
wireless networks, IP mobility support, and standardization development. Section
3 discusses the handover procedure to achieve seamless mobility. In Section 4, we
study the state of the art security mechanisms for handover management, followed by
the analysis of security impacts on handover. Section 5 covers our proposal of local
administrative domain, the protocol implementations in simulation environment,
and our analysis of testing results. We conclude our work in Section 6.
2 Mobility in Wireless IP Networks
The future networking environment is envisioned to be a unified network inter-
connected by an IP infrastructure and supported by heterogeneous access technolo-
gies [AXM04]. Following this trend, a fast transition is taking place in current mobile
industry, which is marked by the ongoing convergence of IP data networking with
the widely deployed telecommunication infrastructure to provide integrated voice,
video, and data services to mobile subscribers. As a key feature enabled by wireless
communication, mobility exerts enormous impact during this transition towards the
integrated wireless IP networks.
To provide an overview of mobility solutions in current wireless IP networks, we cover
the following topics in this section, including the organization and architecture of
a general wireless network, state of the art mobility solutions, and mobility related
standardization development by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), and 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP).
2.1 Wireless networking
The impact of wireless networking is profound. Triggered by the success of cellular
networks, the number of mobile phone users is growing at an unprecedented speed
over the last decade with the number of cellular subscribers already surpassing the
number of main telephone lines [INT07]. This huge growth stimulates the devel-
4opment of mobile devices and wireless access technologies to support better mobile
service experience. Owing to reasonable setup cost and flexible service provision,
wireless systems are chosen to supplement or replace fixed line systems in many
developing countries where it is too expensive or impossible to set up well connected
wired telephony infrastructure [Sch03]. In most developed countries, wireless devices
such as mobile phones have become critical tools offering great convenience and as-
sistance to daily lives. In addition, wireless local area networks (WLAN) with their
increasing popularity provide good enhancement and alternative to wired networks
at many locations including homes, campuses, and companies. New applications
such as wireless sensor networks and smart homes are emerging gradually from re-
search prototypes to concrete implementations. By connecting all kinds of wireless
devices ranging from smart sensors to personal computers, wireless networks enable
us fast and convenient access to the Internet and step by step bring the ideal of
ubiquitous computing closer to reality.
Concerning the data communication in wireless networks, information exchange is
based on transmitting signals in the form of electromagnetic waves over unbounded
media such as atmosphere. The means of data transmission make the wireless com-
munication different from its wired counterpart, in which signals are transmitted
along fixed and bounded media such as copper twisted pair or optical fiber. This
characteristic of wireless transmission offers a unique advantage of supporting user
mobility in that it releases the data communication from stringent physical restric-
tion, such as wires connecting to the network. Take WLAN for example, the access
point (AP) in a building, which is a device allowing wireless devices to connect to
the wireless network, can enable wireless connectivity for all users within its radio
coverage range. Users equipped with wireless devices can then move freely within
the confined zone and enjoy easy access to the Internet at anytime, without being
bothered to find a wire to access the network whenever they move.
Compared with the first milestone in wireless communication marked by the Guglielmo
Marconi’s transmission of wireless telegraphs across Atlantic Ocean in 1896 [Sta05],
wireless transmission schemes and network organizations have evolved a lot. Nowa-
days, the existing wireless networks can be mainly divided into two groups as infras-
tructure based and ad hoc based [Sch03]. Figure 1 highlights the basic architecture
of two types and key components in a general wireless environment.
Based on Figure 1, we identify the following components that form a general wireless

















Figure 1: Infrastructure based and ad hoc based wireless networks.
tructure. First, mobile node is a wireless enabled device that lies at the edge of the
network and runs software applications. In real practice, a MN could be for example
a laptop, a mobile phone, or a PDA. Second, wireless link is the term covering both
technology aspects and physical media that connect the MN to the access point.
Different wireless link technologies have different transmission rates over different
distances. Third, an access point is the coordinate system responsible for sending
and receiving data to and from the MNs that associate to the access point. Every
AP has its own radio coverage to allow MNs within this range to communicate to
it. Cell towers in GSM/GPRS system and access points in IEEE 802.11 WLAN are
the examples in these popular wireless systems. Fourth, network infrastructure is
the network core that interconnects other systems and networks. Via network in-
frastructure, mobile nodes can communicate with other hosts belonging to different
networks.
For infrastructure based wireless networks, the access point is the key component
that carries out most of wireless network functionalities within the infrastructure. It
controls wireless media access and acts also as a bridge connecting to other wireless
and wired networks. Because the communication complexity lies mainly on AP,
6mobile node can remain comparably simple in an infrastructure based network.
Owing to the infrastructure design, several access points can be combined to form
a logical network domain that is connected via the existing infrastructure, so that a
number of wireless networks can be connected to form a larger network beyond the
actual radio coverage of each AP. At the same time, infrastructure based networks
lose some of the flexibility that wireless communication can offer. For example, it is
not suitable for emergency and disaster scenarios where no infrastructure is left to
setup necessary communication channels. Nowadays, cellular and satellite systems
are typical examples that adopt the infrastructure based model [Sch03].
For ad hoc based networks, no infrastructure is needed to interconnect each mobile
entity. A mobile node in an ad hoc network can directly communicate with others
without the controlling and forwarding support from access point. Data transmission
in the ad hoc network is possible only if two hosts are within each other’s radio range,
or there are other hosts along the path that can forward data to the destination.
Compared to infrastructure based networks, the complexity of ad hoc networking
lies on the mobile nodes that are required to control media access, handle routing,
and deal with wireless specific communication problems such as hidden or exposed
terminal problems [Sch03]. As an example, Bluetooth technology which is based on
IEEE 802.15 wireless personal area network specification [WPA08] operates in ad
hoc manner.
A major difference between infrastructure based and ad hoc based networks is that
wireless communication in infrastructure networks takes place only between the
mobile node and the access point, not directly between two MNs. While in ad hoc
networks, a MN can communicate directly with other hosts in an instantaneous
manner without other infrastructure entities involved.
Nowadays both infrastructure and ad hoc models are used in various wireless systems
to organize the network. Wireless hosts in those systems are connected from the edge
of the network to the larger infrastructure via wireless links. Although wireless links
are employed in network infrastructure to connect different routers and systems,
most of recent developments are occurring at the edge of networks. Therefore, we
focus on the wireless communication at the edges of wireless networks following the
infrastructure based model. Ad hoc networking is out the scope of this thesis.
For the forthcoming wireless network environment as proposed in Beyond 3G (B3G)
and 4G [3GP08b], there is an increasing need to integrate the existing wireless net-









Figure 2: Envisioned architecture for unified wireless IP networks.
mentary characteristics of WLAN and cellular systems with fast short-distance ac-
cess, and slow long-distance access, respectively, the recent trend in mobile industry
is to integrate the existing WLAN networks with other wireless mobile systems in-
cluding the Mobile Communications/General Packet Radio Service (GSM/GPRS) [GSM08],
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System [UMT08], Code Division Multiple Ac-
cess 2000 [CDM08], and 802.16 [WiM08] under a common IP backbone. As shown in
Figure 2 of an envisioned architecture for the future wireless IP based networks, the
rational combination of heterogeneous wireless systems under a unified platform will
bring us a cost-effective network environment that is capable of providing ubiqui-
tous information access [Sch03]. The current and emerging wireless systems coupled
with the potential applications promise us a future of always connected information
world.
82.2 Mobility support
Wireless access provides inherent mobility supports, although it is not a prerequisite.
To help identify and understand challenges in the mobile wireless networks, we
draw a distinction between two key concepts in this thesis: the wireless nature of
communication, and the mobile capacity that wireless communication enables. The
former term wireless includes the technologies and schemes that users can utilize
to access the network and communicate with other parties. The mobile term, also
referred as mobility, describes the moving capabilities of devices and individuals.
In current environment, networking nodes can be wireless but not necessarily mobile
such as the stationary workstations in an office that has wireless connection. At the
same time, mobile devices may require no wireless connection such as a wired laptop
that is used at home at first and then carried by its owner to the office. Obviously,
the most exciting area belongs to the intersection of wireless and mobile, where users
can utilize multiple wireless technologies via mobile devices to obtain all kinds of
network services on the move, with always on connectivity at anytime, anywhere.
The urgent need to support mobility in wireless networks brings up multiple pro-
posals to assist mobility management. The IETF Mobile IP [Per02, JPA04] and its
enhancements [S+05, J+05] are the most well known mobility management schemes
that are studied and deployed. The lately proposed Proxy Mobile IP protocol [LYC08,
G+08] provides network-controlled mobility support, in which mobility management
functions are carried out by the access network without involving of mobile termi-
nals.
2.2.1 Macro mobility with Mobile IP
Internet Protocol (IP) [Ins81, DH98] is the architectural foundation of the current
Internet. As a common base, thousands of applications employ IP to communicate
across different types of networks. Bearing in mind the success of Internet owing to
the principles of simplicity and scalability, to develop mobility supports at the IP
layer can minimize modifications over existing network architecture.
In contrast to mobile telecommunication systems such as GSM, which target at
mobile users from the beginning, the original design of IP did not take mobility into
account. In IP networks, routing is based on the stationary IP address, which is
used as the location identifier for the host. Every IP datagram is forwarded in a hop-
by-hop manner from its source to the destination. Regarding the IP routing, it is
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Figure 3: Mobile IP entities and correlations.
assumed that the IP address of a host can uniquely identify its point of attachment.
Therefore, each host must be located at the network in accordance with its IP
address in order to receive IP datagrams destined to it. Otherwise, datagrams can
not reach the destination. This nature of IP routing limits the host mobility. As
every time a mobile node moves to another network, the change of IP address could
lead to communication interruption because all the datagrams of ongoing session
will be forwarded to the home network of the mobile node instead of the current
network.
To support mobility in IP networks, the Mobile IP protocol [Per02, JPA04] is pro-
posed with the goal of solving the routing problems during the host’s migration from
one IP subnet to another. As an open standard, it provides mobility support over
a large area, allowing a mobile node to keep its IP address, stay connected, and
maintain the ongoing communication sessions while moving between neighboring
networks.
As shown in Figure 3, three functional entities are introduced by Mobile IP: mobile
node (MN), home agent (HA), and foreign agent (FA) [Per97]. First, MN is an end-
system or router that can change its point of attachment to the network using Mobile
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IP. MN keeps its home address when the point of attachment changes. As long as the
link layer connectivity is provided, MN can continuously communicate with other
entities in the network. MN is not necessarily a small device such as mobile phone
or laptop, while for example, a router on an aircraft can be an MN. Second, HA is a
router residing on MN’s home network. It is able to deliver datagrams to MN when
MN is away from the home network and maintains the location registry for MN. HA
also configures and maintains mobility security association including shared keys.
Third, FA is a router on the foreign network that provides mobility services to the
MN during its visit. FA is able to forward datagrams coming from HA to the MN
currently served by it. Any node in the Internet communicating with an MN is
referred to as correspondent node (CN).
Mobile IP employs two IP addresses to enable mobility: a fixed home address (HoA)
that serves as unique identity for the MN; a care-of address (CoA) that changes at
each new point of attachment in foreign networks. Between the home IP address
and MN’s current CoA, an association is maintained by the home agent. The CoA
is a temporary address for MN in a visiting network in order to route the datagram
from HA to MN’s current location.
In essence, Mobile IP consists of three functions that cooperate with each other,
including the agent discovery, registration, and tunneling. For agent discovery, it is
the process of obtaining an IP address for the MN. By periodically receiving agent
advertisement messages that are broadcasted from FA, MN is able to detect a new
subnet in which it moves. A newly arrived MN can send agent solicitation messages
on the link to learn the presence of any prospective FA.
Regarding the MIP registration as depicted in Figure 4, when an MN discovers that
it has moved or will move into a foreign network, MN obtains a new CoA from
the FA. The care-of address can be obtained by listening agent advertisement or
soliciting the FA actively. The MN registers the new CoA with the HA through
FA. HA updates the MN’s mobility binding by associating the latest care-of address
with the home address. A successful Mobile IP registration sets up the routing for
transporting datagram to the MN as it moves across different networks.
For tunneling, in order to deliver the datagram to MN when it is outside its home
network, Mobile IP uses tunneling and encapsulation to solve the IP routing prob-
lems. When a datagram destined to MN arrives at the home work, HA will intercept
and encapsulate it. The encapsulated datagram will be tunneled to MN’s current
CoA. After receiving the datagram, the FA serving the MN will decapsulate the
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datagram and further forward it to the MN.
When a mobile node moves from one network to another, it needs to change its point
of attachment to the access network, which is referred to as handover [MK04]. The
handover procedure in terms of network routing will take place in following steps:
1) MN obtains a new CoA when entering a new network; 2) MN registers the new
CoA with its HA; 3) HA sets up a new tunnel associated with MN’s current point of
attachment, and removes the old tunnel associated with the old CoA; 4) Once the
tunnel is set up, HA will deliver future datagrams destined to the MN to its new
CoA through the tunnel.
In the original design of Mobile IP, when MN replies to the correspondent node with
which MN is communicating, the datagram will be routed directly to the destina-
tion with the MN’s home address as its source address. However, this data path
may bring routing problems in that many currently deployed firewalls demand a
topologically correct source IP address to deliver datagrams. If the source address
of a datagram implies that it is not from the foreign network where MN is visiting,
the firewall of the foreign network will drop the datagram instead of forwarding it.
To solve this problem, an extension of Mobile IP referred as reverse tunneling is
proposed [Mon01]. As illustrated in Figure 5 on the difference between reverse tun-
neling and basic Mobile IP in terms of routing path, the scheme in reverse tunneling
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Figure 5: Reverse tunneling for Mobile IP.
the tunnel between FA and HA becomes bi-directional. The original payload from
MN will be encapsulated in a datagram with FA’s IP as the source address and
HA’s IP as the destination address. After receiving the datagrams from FA, HA
decapsulates them and forwards the original datagram further to the correspondent
node. By building a reverse tunnel, the datagram can pass through the firewall at
the foreign network.
In general, by introducing tunneling and traffic redirection mechanisms, Mobile IP
solves the basic mobility problems in IP networks. The solution is scalable because
only the participating components need to be Mobile IP aware. No other routers
or hosts with which the MN is communicating need extra modifications. As the
mobility mechanism is built at network layer, Mobile IP is independent of link layer
technologies. This feature makes it suitable for mobility management across different
domains with heterogeneous access technologies.
2.2.2 Micro mobility enhancement
Mobile IP provides a solution to the mobility management in the Internet. However,
the protocol is far from perfect. For mobile nodes moving frequently between subnets
inside one domain, Mobile IP can generate a significant amount of control traffic
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across the Internet. The mobility management signalling delay increases as the
distance between foreign network and home network increases. For delay-sensitive
applications such as real time voice service, the increased delay makes it impossible
to maintain the quality of service at an acceptable level when the attachment to the
network changes. Moreover, establishing new tunnels to deliver packets to frequent
moving nodes leads to additional delays, causing unnecessary packet loss. As the
number of mobile users grows, the mobility associated traffic in the core network
will affect the data traffic negatively [CKK02]. Due to the problems stated, Mobile
IP is unsuitable for mobile entities that move with high frequency across different
domains. The challenges of Mobile IP in terms of performance and scalability on
the level of global Internet lead to the macro/micro mobility design that divides the
mobility administration domain into two parts in terms of geographic coverage.
As illustrated in Figure 6 of macro/micro mobility approach, for macro mobility
across wide area networks, Mobile IP is a suitable mechanism to manage the move-
ments of mobile nodes between distant domains. On the other hand, to optimize
local handover with less overhead, micro mobility schemes are used to manage the









Figure 6: Overview of macro/macro mobility approach.
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mobility management that can be broadly classified into two groups: tunnel-based
schemes and routing-based schemes [AXM04].
In tunnel-based schemes, local or hierarchical registration and encapsulation are
adopted to limit the scope of mobility related signalling. The tunnel-based design
rely on a tree-shape structure that is formed by a set of foreign agents. Encapsulated
datagram from a home agent is delivered first to the foreign agent which is the root
of the tree-shape domain. Each foreign agent on the tree decapsulates and then
re-encapsulates the datagram as the traffic is forwarded down the tree of foreign
agents towards mobile node current point of attachment. A set of foreign agents in
the tree maintain the location database in a distributed form for each visiting mobile
node. The location entries in database are created and maintained by registration
messages transmitted by mobile nodes. When a mobile node moves between different
foreign agents, location updates are conducted at the optimal point of the tree-shape
domain.
In routing-based schemes, routers maintain mobile specific routes to forward data-
grams. The mobile specific routes are updated with host mobility mechanisms. The
routing-based design avoids the overhead from recapsulation and re-encapsulation as
used in tunnel-based schemes. The routing-based proposals use routing to forward
datagrams toward mobile node’s current point of attachment with mobile specific
routes. Implicit or explicit signalling is introduced to update the mobile specific
routes in routers. To illustrate the design and functionality, we select Hierarchy Mo-
bile IPv6 [S+05] for tunnel-based scheme and Cellular IP [Val99] for routing based
scheme. Figure 7 presents the basic architecture of the two proposals.
Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) introduces a hierarchical structure for micro
mobility management. A mobility anchor point (MAP) is installed in the local net-
work, which is responsible for this domain. MAP acts as a local home agent within
the domain for the visiting mobile node. MAP receives all the datagrams from the
Internet on behalf of the mobile node. It encapsulates and forwards them directly to
mobile node’s current address, the link care-of address (LCOA). As long as the mo-
bile node stays inside the domain of MAP, the globally visible address, the regional
care-of address (RCOA) does not change. The MAP internal domain boundaries
are defined by the access router (AR) which advertises the MAP information to
the attached mobile nodes. MAP assists with the local handover and maintains the
RCOA and LCOA mapping. Mobile node registers the RCOA with its home agent
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Figure 7: Basic architecture for HMIPv6 and CIP.
mobile node moves locally, it will register its new LCOA only with the MAP in this
domain with the RCOA unchanged.
Cellular IP (CIP) provides local handover support without renewed registration
procedures. A cellular IP gateway (CIPGW) is installed for each domain which
functions as a foreign agent. Inside each CIP domain, all nodes participate in
collecting the routing information to access the mobile node. The routing path
is built based on the origin of datagrams sent by the mobile node towards the
CIPGW. Handover performance is improved by allowing simultaneous forwarding
of datagrams destined to the mobile node along multiple paths. A mobile node
moving between neighboring cells will be able to receive datagrams via both old and
new base stations (BS) if supported by lower protocol layers.
The comparison of various IP layer micro-mobility solutions are discussed in details
by F. Chiussi [CKK02] and A. Campbell [C+02] based on different criteria. Although
there are differences among micro mobility protocols in terms of routing and control
signalling, their operational principle is largely similar [AXM04]. In each proposal,
the domain root routers are introduced with the purpose of localizing most of the
signalling traffic within the local domain. To avoid global signalling overhead from
16
Mobile IP, tunnel-based schemes enhance the network scalability by introducing
hierarchies, with local registration and update addressed by the gateway router at
each hierarchy. The routing-based schemes take advantages of the IP forwarding
to maintain the location data base at each intermediate node for every MN in the
domain. In general, tunnel-based methods provide the reliability depending on
mobility agents at each hierarchy with additional cost and delay. The routing-based
methods avoid tunneling overhead, but they suffer from the high cost of propagating
mobile specific routes to all routers within the domain.
Given the fast adoption of IP communication in current wireless networks, IP based
micro mobility protocols can complement Mobile IP by offering fast and efficient
handover control in localized areas. In highly mobile environment where mobile
nodes frequently change their point of attachment to the network, micro mobility
schemes help alleviate the problems introduced by the basic Mobile IP such as sig-
nificant network overhead in terms of increased delay, packet loss and signalling. As
Mobile IP supports the macro level mobility across IP domains, a rational combi-
nation of Mobile IP and micro mobility enhancement protocols can yield a flexible
and scalable mobility management framework that supports mobility at the Internet
scale.
2.2.3 Network-controlled mobility with Proxy Mobile IP
Network-controlled mobility is a topic gaining popularity in recent IP mobility de-
velopment. Compared with the host-controlled mobility such as Mobile IP in which
mobile node has the primary control of mobility functions, network-controlled mo-
bility provides another solution to manage the mobility in wireless networks.
In network-controlled mobility, network entities are responsible for collecting and
measuring network information for mobility management purpose. It is the network
side rather than mobile node that handles the mobility management functions such
as sending registration and reporting to the home agent the change of point of
attachment. To illustrate the principle of network-controlled mobility, we choose
the Proxy mobile IP [LYC08, G+08] based on Mobile IP as an example and discuss
the benefits of network-controlled mobility.
For mobility management, Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP) defines three terms as depicted
in Figure 8: Proxy Mobile IP Domain (PMIP-Domain), Local Mobility Anchor










Figure 8: Proxy Mobile IP Domain and entities.
work in which PMIP protocol is used for mobility management. A PMIP-Domain
contains a set of LMAs and MAGs, where authorization can be ensured between
LMAs and MAGs to send proxy binding updates on behalf of MNs.
Local mobility anchor (LMA) is a router that is responsible for maintaining host
routes and forwarding information for mobile nodes under its control. It is the home
agent for mobile nodes in a PMIP-Domain. A LMA has the functional capabilities of
home agent as defined in MIP protocol specification with the additional capabilities
required for PMIP protocol.
Mobile Access Gateway (MAG) is a functional network element on access router in
the PMIP-Domain. It manages the mobility signalling for mobile nodes attached to
its access link. The MAG tracks the mobile node’s IP level mobility between edge
links and maintains the bi-directional tunnel together with LMA which is in charge
of the mobile node. The MAG terminates the data traffic from LMA to the mobile
node which is under its control and forwards data traffic from the mobile node to
the corresponding LMA.
As PMIP is based on Mobile IP, its mobility function design follows the same prin-
ciple as specified in Mobile IP, but mobility related operations are carried out by











Figure 9: General Proxy Mobile IP network attachment.
network attachment in PMIP.
When a mobile node enters a PMIP-Domain, it first attaches to the access network
at link layer and conducts access authentication procedure. If the authentication
is successful, mobile node gains the right to access the PMIP-Domain and sends a
solicitation message to the MAG. To update the current location of MN, MAG sends
a Proxy Binding Update to the LMA which is responsible for the MN. When the
Proxy Binding Acknowledgement from LMA is received by MAG, a bi-directional
tunnel is established between MAG and LMA for mobile node’s data traffic. Follow-
ing the tunnel set up, mobile node will conduct the address configuration procedure.
Once the address configuration is done, mobile node is able to send and receive data
from the access network.
For data traffic, LMA is the topological anchor point for all the mobile nodes under
its control. LMA receives any datagram sent from other nodes in or outside the
PMIP-Domain to mobile nodes of which it is in charge, and appends an outer header
on each datagram. LMA then forwards the datagram to MAG through the bi-
directional tunnel. On the other end of the tunnel, MAG removes the outer header
of the received datagram and forwards it to the mobile node. In PMIP, MAG acts as
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the default router for mobile node under its control. Any datagram sent from mobile
node to correspondent node will be received by MAG first. MAG will forward the
datagram to LMA via the bi-directional tunnel. LMA will then route the datagram
to the correct destination onwards. Different from the base MIP protocol, PMIP
adopts bi-direction tunnel to transfer data between LMA and MAG, which is similar
to the reverse tunneling extension in MIP.
As one of the network-controlled IP mobility management protocols, PMIP reuses
Mobile IP to gain the maturity of development and deployment in telecommuni-
cation industry. This greatly helps drive its development. In recent years, PMIP
has become one of the most important IP mobility protocols adopted by various next
generation wireless architectures including Mobile WiMAX [WiM06], 3GPP [3GP07a]
and 3GPP2 enhancement [3GP06]. Besides PMIP, 3GPP GPRS Tunneling Protocol
(GTP) [3GP07b] is another network-controlled mobility scheme in use nowadays.
Regarding the design of network-controlled mobility, one major intention is to reduce
signal traffic over the air link between mobile nodes and access points. Different from
Mobile IP, the sending of registrations and binding updates is handled by MAG in
Proxy Mobile IP, rather than letting the MN exchange signalling messages over its
air link between MN and AP. Due to the power supply limit on mobile sets, it is
better to handle most of mobility related signalling on network side entities rather
than the power stringent mobile nodes. By letting the network entities handle
mobility signalling, network-controlled mobility supports efficient energy usage for
mobile nodes.
Compared with host-controlled mobility, another benefit of network-controlled mo-
bility is the simplified IP stack and system software implementation on mobile nodes.
This is a highly desirable solution concerning the advantage of having interoperable
and standardized mobility management protocol scalable to large networks while
requiring no host stack involvement. With the network side handling mobility func-
tions, there are less requirements and modifications on each mobile node. Given
multiple mobility schemes and wireless access technologies developed by different
organizations, it is possible to have conflicting requirements on mobile nodes. As-
suming the mobility support from the network side, conflicts can be reduced to mini-
mum on mobile nodes, and technology migration process such as IPv4-to-IPv6 could
be transparently achieved without the extensive modifications on mobile nodes’ soft-
ware stack.
For completeness, we point out that mobility solutions in wireless networks can
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be categorized into different layers according to the OSI reference model [OSI94].
Besides the network layer mobility solutions discussed in this section, proposals
have been made on other layers to assist mobility, such as Session Initiation Pro-
tocol (SIP) [R+02] on application layer, Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [MN06] be-
tween network layer and transport layer, and Stream Control Transmission Protocol
(SCTP) [Ste07] on transport layer. As we focus on the network layer solutions, de-
tails of proposal on other layers are out the scope of our discussion. It should be
noted that IP version plays a key role in mobility protocol design. Discussions can
be found in related document [JPA04] of IP version impacts on mobility solution,
and their contents are beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.3 Standardization development
Given that mobile networking is possible nowadays, it is still challenging to provide
complete service continuity during mobile user’s movement across different networks.
In order to achieve seamless mobility and connectivity in the coming wireless IP net-
works, organizations including IEEE, IETF, and 3GPP contribute their efforts to
the standardization development. With the purpose of understanding the trend in
mobility development, we present an overview of recent and ongoing standardiza-
tion contributions from different organizations aiming at seamless mobility in both
homogeneous and heterogeneous wireless access environments.
I. IEEE
The standardization focus of IEEE in mobility management includes the IEEE
802.11 [WLA08], IEEE 802.16 [IEE06], and IEEE 802.21 [MIH09]. Up to now,
the link layer mobility enhancements for homogeneous environment are provided by
IEEE, and its recent proposal of media independent handover (MIH) targets at the
integration of heterogeneous access technologies to allow upper layer protocols to
take advantage of information from the underlying link.
• IEEE 802.11 WLAN:
For IEEE 802.11 devices, the migration from the coverage of one access point
(AP) to another includes the detection of loss or degradation of the current
connection, determining the new AP to connect to, and establishing link layer
connectivity with the new access network. The IEEE 802.11k [IEE08a] amends
radio resource measurement schemes to facilitate the decision algorithms for
detecting the loss or degradation of an ongoing connection. The fast basic
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service set (BSS) transition amendment of IEEE 802.11r [IEE08b] optimizes
the number of information exchanges to establish authentication between a
station (STA) and the target AP. IEEE 802.11r suggests employ IEEE 802.11k
schemes to reduce scanning time, and introduces a hierarchical key structure
to optimize key forwarding and distribution.
• IEEE 802.16 WiMAX:
The IEEE 802.16 networks provide centralized broadband wireless access.
IEEE 802.16e provides a mobility support to reduce handover delays in its
amendment [IEE06].
• IEEE 802.21 MIH:
The main focus of IEEE 802.21 working group is the media independent han-
dover (MIH). With the final standard approved in January 2009, the goal of
IEEE 802.21 is to optimize the handover procedure in mobility management
between heterogeneous access technologies. The proposal covers both wired
and wireless technologies ranging from the media specifications of IEEE 802
to that of 3GPP.
II. IETF
IETF invests considerable efforts in the auxiliary enhancements for seamless mo-
bility among heterogeneous access technologies connected by an IP based network
infrastructure. The contributions come mainly from different working groups (WGs)
within the IETF. The work can be classified as end-to-end approaches, enhanced
Mobile IP schemes, and auxiliary mobility enhancements [E+07].
• End-to-end approaches:
To solve mobility without or with minimum network support, schemes includ-
ing host identity protocol (HIP) [MN06], stream control transmission protocol
(SCTP) [Ste07], and the well known Mobile IP are proposed by IETF.
• Enhanced Mobile IP schemes:
The IETF MIPv6 signalling and handoff optimization group (MIPSHOP) pro-
poses two enhancement plans based on the Mobile IP: Fast MIPv6 (FMIPv6)
and Hierarchical MIPv6 (HMIPv6). FMIPv6 [Koo08] is intended to decrease
packets loss by introducing tunnel between the old and new access router.
HMIPv6 reduces signalling overhead by introducing hierarchical structure for
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mobility signalling. The combination of two schemes is further proposed in
F-HMIP [J+05] in order to promote the handover performance in mobility
management.
• Auxiliary mobility enhancements:
IETF working groups (WG) gather lots of efforts to provide mobility sup-
ports in five categories: 1) context transfer and candidate access router dis-
covery, contributed by SeaMoby WG [Kem05, L+05b, L+05a]; 2) IP network
attachment detection, contributed by DNA WG [CD05]; 3) network-based
mobility management, contributed by NETLMM WG, which evolves to Proxy
MIPv6 [G+08]; 4) establishing secure association with hierarchical key ex-
change, contributed by MOBIKE WG and HoKEY WG [Ero06, KT06, C+08,
ND08, S+08, HO09, OWZ09]; 5) flow based mobility using multiple interfaces,
contributed by MONAMI [M+08]. Technical details and achievements of each
WG can be found from the corresponding IETF WG documents.
III. 3GPP
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) [3GP08a] established in December
1998 is collaboration among groups of telecommunication associations, aiming at
making a globally applicable mobile phone system specification. Starting from the
original Release 98 published in 1998, 3GPP standardization Releases incorporate
a large number of individual standard documents covering radio, core network, and
service architecture in 3G systems.
Because cellular networks in 3G system inherently encompass supports for seamless
homogeneous handover, 3GPP focuses mainly on the make-before-break handover.
As proposed in the 3GPP GPRS Tunneling Protocol (GTP), the mobile nodes in
3GPP networks are responsible for reporting radio conditions and locations to the
network and network entities collaborate to control and perform seamless handover.
In the forthcoming standardization Release 8, long term evolution (LTE) and system
architecture evolution (SAE) are currently under discussion [3GP08b]. The major
updates of Release 8 are expected to cover architecture, protocols and radio access
technologies. Besides the goal of increasing radio interface bandwidth for wireless
mobile networks, LTE/SAE aims at enabling access of 3GPP networks via multiple
non-3GPP access networks such as WiFi and WiMAX together with seamless han-
dover support across different access technologies. As proposed in LTE/SAE, 4th
generation networks are going to be an ALL-IP based infrastructure with multiple
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services built upon the IP backbone.
As future networking environment calls for integrated mobility management tech-
niques that can take advantage of IP communication, the IP mobility proposals from
different organizations provide promising solutions to enable mobility management.
For completeness, we point out that mobility management in wireless networks con-
tains two elements: location management and handover management [AXM04]. The
location management enables wireless systems to track the mobile hosts in the net-
work and provides mechanisms for mobile hosts to update their locations. As an
example, paging technique is a typical location management scheme that is widely
used in current cellular systems. As our thesis concentrates on handover manage-
ment in wireless networks, mechanisms for location management are out the scope
of our discussion.
3 Handover Management
Handover management is a fundamental concern for wireless systems to support
seamless connectivity and mobility. Due to its key role in achieving seamless mobil-
ity in the future IP based wireless networks, lots of research contributions go into
this area. To understand the motivation and design principle, we provide a gen-
eral discussion of handover management in the context of wireless mobility. IEEE
802.21 Media Independent Handover (MIH) [MIH09] is chosen to illustrate the lat-
est industrial development catering for the future multi-homing and multi-access
heterogeneous environment.
3.1 Handover in wireless mobility
Wireless technologies vary widely in terms of bandwidth, latency, network coverage,
and mobility. Nowadays, no single wireless system provides an optimal combination
with high bandwidth, low latency, wide area coverage, and strong mobility support.
Given the current level of technology development, it is a great challenge to provide
users with satisfactory mobile experience in existing wireless networks. The key
to this challenge lies in a flexible utilization of the available networks achieved by
switching between different wireless access technologies whenever necessary [C+06,
SK98].
In the context of wireless mobility, the procedure of switching access networks is
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referred to as handover. By definition, handover is the process by which an active
mobile host changes its point of attachment to the network, or when such a change
is attempted [MK04]. To enable host mobility in wireless networks with continuous
connectivity, handover management is a fundamental issue that needs to be solved.
To discuss handover management we first introduce a mobile specific term, roaming,
which is frequently used in current mobile systems. In the context of wireless mo-
bility, roaming is a particular aspect of host mobility. It is an operator based term
involving formal agreements between operators that allows a mobile node to get
connectivity from a foreign network [MK04]. Roaming includes the functionalities
to help mobile hosts exchange their identities to the foreign access network so that
inter-operator agreement can be activated to enable services in the visiting network.
In wireless environment, handover management entails most of the functionalities
that are necessary for seamless mobility across different networks while preserving
the QoS and migration transparency. In general, the handover process includes
a series of signalling and context transfer between mobile nodes and network side
to exchange user credentials and network information. As an example, Figure 10


















Figure 10: Signal flow of a simple handover in GSM.
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system [Rah93].
In GSM system, MN is connected to base transceiver station (BTS), which functions
as the access point to the network. Base station controller (BSC) manages the BTS
and handles the handover management. When a MN moves into the coverage of a
new BTS, it will receive wireless signal from this BTS. MN sends the measurement
report to the old BTS, which forwards the report to BSC in charge. Based on
the reported value, BSC will decide whether it is necessary to initiate handover.
Once the decision is made, BSC will allocate resources for the new channel and
send channel activation signal to the new BTS. The new BTS checks whether there
are enough resources available, and if resources can be allocated, the new BTS will
activate communication channel for the MN and send acknowledgement back to
BSC. BSC then issues a handover command which is forwarded to MN via the old
BTS. Upon receiving handover command, MN breaks its old link and starts access
to the new BTS. The following step is to establish link between MN and new BTS.
When the new link is up, handover complete signal will be sent from new BTS to
BSC. To release the previously allocated resources, BSC sends clear command to
the old BTS. Old BTS will send back a clear complete signal to BSC to indicate the
end of a successful handover.
Given the current wireless environment, when mobile nodes move across different
networks adopting the same or different access technologies, handover may arise if
one of the following conditions is met: 1) When a mobile node is moving out of
the coverage of the serving domain and entering a new domain, while the signal
strength of previous access point (or base station) falls below a certain threshold
value; 2) When a mobile node currently connected to one network chooses to switch
to another one for its future service needs; 3) When load balancing is needed to
distribute the overall network load among different wireless systems [AXM04].
In general, handover procedure can be classified to different types according to as-
pects such as control, scope, connectivity, and performance. For control aspect,
handovers are considered to fall into one of the two classifications: host-initiated
and network-initiated. Concerning the host-initiated handover, the mobile node is
responsible to determine its new point of attachment and establish the link connec-
tion by following corresponding protocol required by the network side. Handover in
Mobile IP is a typical host-initiated process. On the other hand, network-initiated
handover let the network side to carry out all necessary tasks such as network
measurement and handover decision. Handover adopted in the cellular system is
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regarded as network-initiated procedure.
Regarding the scope of handover, an important concept is the wireless overlay net-
work, which is referred to as different wireless systems that span from room, campus,
metropolitan, and regional size, fitting into a hierarchy of network structure [SK98].
The structure of wireless overlay network is depicted in Figure 11.
In the hierarchy structure of wireless overlay network, lower levels consist of high
bandwidth and low latency wireless systems that cover small area, while higher
levels are comprised of lower bandwidth and high latency systems that provide
wireless coverage over a larger geographic area. Vertical handover, in the overlay
network architecture, is a handover between access points (or base stations) that
are using different wireless technologies. On the other hand, horizontal handover
refers to the switching process between access points (or base stations) that are
using the same type of wireless technology. As an example, when a user switches
the wireless access from campus area WiMAX to room area WiFi, it is regarded as
a vertical handover. When a user moves from one room to another by switching
between two WiFi access points, this process is referred to as horizontal handover.









Integration of heterogeneous wireless 
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Figure 11: Vertical and horizontal handover in wireless overlay network [SK98].
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cellular telecommunication systems [SK98].
Regarding the connectivity aspect, two types of handover are defined: break before
make (BBM) and make before break (MBB), which are also referred to as hard
handover and soft handover, respectively [MK04]. During a BBM handover, mo-
bile node breaks the previously established connection before it establishes a new
connection to the new access network. Therefore mobile node can not maintain
simultaneous connectivity with both the old and new access network. Unlike BBM,
during a MBB handover mobile node establishes new connection before the old link
is taken down. This feature makes the mobile node capable of communicating si-
multaneously with the old and new access networks. To enable MBB handover,
necessary support should be provided by mobile equipments and access networks.
Regarding the handover performance, handover latency and handover loss are two
major factors to affect the quality of service (QoS) for mobile services. By definition,
handover latency is the difference between the time a mobile node is last able to send
and/or receive an IP packet from the previous network, and the time the mobile node
is able to send and/or receive an IP packet through the new network. Handover loss
is referred to as the packet loss induced by the handover. To promote performance,
fast handover is proposed to minimize handover latency without explicit interest in
packet loss. At the same time, smooth handover aims at minimizing packet loss
without explicit concern of additional delays introduced by handover. Seamless
handover is the optimal handover process that is both fast and smooth [MK04].
Currently, the proposed mobility management solutions have ranged from link layer
to application layer. As a key part of mobility management, the handover manage-
ment discussed in this thesis concentrates on link layer and network layer solutions.
A recent trend attracting research attentions is the cross-layer approach, which uti-
lizes the information of underlying links to assist the handover process [MIH09].
By using the link layer information such as signal strength report and movement
detection, cross-layer approach assists handover preparation in advance, and aims
at promoting the overall handover performance.
3.2 Seamless handover
3.2.1 Motivation, challenge, and principle
Owing to the fast growth of mobile Internet markets, the significance of mobility
has increased tremendously. As the key to realize seamless mobility in current
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wireless networks, seamless handover is defined as the attempt to provide persistent
connection to mobile users at the given level of quality of service (QoS) during their
moving from one access network to another [EN02]. The performance of seamless
handover exerts a crucial impact on the overall mobility experience.
For service users, seamless mobility implies that they can exploit the best experi-
ence by switching between networks to meet their requirements in terms of cost,
QoS, security, and energy consumption. At the same time, service providers can
utilize the power of seamless mobility to offer compelling and value-added services
to promote their profits as well as the user experience. By allowing users to con-
duct handover on demand without degrading the performance, network providers
can improve their resource utilization and network capacity. The service availability
can also be improved by balancing the number of users in different networks. The
benefits of seamless mobility are highly desirable and hence motivating the research
work on seamless handover.
In general, seamless mobility can be achieved by enabling seamless handover across
diverse wireless networks. It requires that the existing communication session should
be transferred and resumed in the target network seamlessly. Two performance
metrics are regarded as the basic rule for a successfull seamless handover: 1) the
handover latency should be no more than a few hundred milliseconds; 2) the QoS of
source and target systems should be nearly identical, or the users should not perceive
any change according to service experience during and after the handover [LSP08].
Regarding the existing wireless networks, different systems vary from each other in
terms of bandwidth, coverage and mobility support. It is complex and challenging
to conduct handover seamlessly from one access to another, especially in the forth-
coming IP based multi-access heterogeneous environment where vertical handover
between different types of access technologies occurs frequently. To enable seamless
handover, one major challenge comes from the incompatibility problems across dif-
ferent wireless systems [HY03]. As current wireless systems such as Wi-Fi, WiMAX,
GSM, and UMTS, are developed by seperate companies or organizations, the link
access technologies, communication protocols, as well as the security policies vary
widely from each other. The policy and security implementation in wireless systems
demand serious consideration due to the involvement of social and business com-
plexity. To conduct handover seamlessly in such environment, a uniform mechanism
based on cross-system design is necessary to enable interoperability.
At the same time, due to the boom of real time IP applications such as voice of IP
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(VoIP), the transmission latency requirement catering to the delay-sensitive applica-
tions exert a huge impact. As recommended by ITU-T, 50 ms is the threashold value
for one way delay regarding most of real time voice and video services [INT08]. This
requirement is not easy to meet in that the variation of handover latency could come
from multiple sources including error induced retransmission, link re-establishment,
access authentication, data base access, and as well as mobility related negotiation
procedures. As an example, the vertical handover occurring between two wireless
networks with different access technologies can be regarded as a demanding pro-
cess, as it requires support from mobile devices, mobility protocols, and the network
infrastructure. Multi-mode enabled device is necessary for the access to different
systems such as Wi-Fi and UMTS. Network should provide adequate coordination
to manage the handover between two systems. In general case, cross-platform agree-
ment is necessary to enable authentication and authorization for vertical handover
across different networks.
To enjoy mobile services freely powered by seamless mobility in the next generation
networks, all the challenges stated for seamless handover need to be addressed. As
the research on seamless handover has been going on for several years, previous
work renders a good basis for our further research, which can be concluded as five
principles of seamless handover [LSP08]:
1) Multi-criteria handover decision - the handover decision should take into account
network measurement as well as other handover related information, including QoS
information, radio resource availability, link layer triggers, and user preference; 2)
Admission control and resource reservation - the resource reservation and admission
control at the target network should be made in advance to minimize the han-
dover latency; 3) Context transfer - during the handover preparation phase, critical
procedures such as authentication in new network should be assisted by sending
security context and QoS context to the target network; 4) Extra information on
new connection - source network should provide specific configuration information
about the target network, such as available radio channels to mobile terminals; 5)
Unified information representation - a unified and unambiguous way of exchanging
and interpreting measurement report QoS context should be provided, especially for
inter-system handover.
The five principles cover the essential requirements for seamless handover in wireless
environment. They provide guidelines for design and implementation and can be
used as metrics to evaluate new proposals for seamless handover.
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3.2.2 Generic approach for seamless handover
Due to its complexity, seamless handover demands a thorough analysis to be fully
understood. Based on previous research work [EN02], a general architectural frame-
work for seamless handover is defined to characterize fundamental elements involved.
To enhance the understanding of seamless handover, we discuss this framework to-
gether with all the necessary components covering major concepts, an overview of
handover procedure, and general approaches to reach seamless handover.
In the mobile environment, a key concept is migration, which occurs when the
mobile element (ME) such as a mobile host moves in the network crossing different
domains. The source domain (Dom-S) and target domain (Dom-T) are both capable
of offering network access for the MEs. The domain representative (Dom-Rep) is
serving the MEs that are currently located in the domain. During a migration, the
Dom-Reps in Dom-S and Dom-T must execute coordinated actions for a ME leaving
Dom-S and entering Dom-T. The coordinated actions are referred to as handover
protocol.
Regarding wireless networking, a domain is the region with wireless coverage such as
cell in traditional telecommunication systems. The Dom-Rep is the representative
of ME to the network side, whose function is similar to the access point in WLAN
networks. Dom-Rep offers various services to the ME including delivering network
events and data to the ME (down stream), as well as from ME to the network (up
stream). Intuitively, a seamless handover indicates that the switching of services
from Dom-S to Dom-T should not result in any distinction as to the service received
by ME from a single Dom-Rep inside each domain. The transparency of migration is
however, highly dependent on services being provided, since each service has a unique
set of properties that need to be satisfied during the whole migration. In specific
case as to an error-prone unreliable environment, seamless handover also means
that the delivery of events should follow the same casual order as if no handover has
occurred. This demands the handover protocol to ensure the casual relationship of
events in both Dom-S and Dom-T, regardless of the interruption due to migration.
Taking into account the nature of wireless systems in terms of coverage, we assume
that both the source and target domains are available during the migration for
MEs to connect. The wireless coverage region of two networks can be regarded as
overlapped at the place where handover is conducted. To simplify the analysis, our
discussion of seamless handover is also based on this assumption.
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To conduct handover, Dom-Reps in both Dom-S and Dom-T need to cooperate to
resume necessary conditions for ME to be served in the target network. Although
the exact procedures depend largely on the specification of each system, the general
tasks for handover can be summarized as follows: 1) link access establishment - ME
establishes its link connection with new domain Dom-T after fulfilling the necessary
authentication and authorization; 2) registration management - either network or
ME registers ME’s entry at Dom-T and de-register at Dom-S; 3) resource manage-
ment - network allocates new resources for ME at Dom-T and de-allocate redundent
resources at Dom-S; 4) status update - either network or ME updates network-
resident state such as route path and address registry at some nodes and/or transfer
it from Dom-S to Dom-T; 5) QoS guarantee - to ensure that the functional or non-
functional properties of service remain the same during and after handover [EN02].
From a generic viewpoint, main events involved in migration include migration ini-
tiation (MI), handover initiation (HI), handover completion (HC), and migration
completion (MC) according to timeline. Figure 12 depicts a time-space diagram
with stated notations for ME. For the sake of simplicity, only the mobile-initiated
handover is discussed since the network-initiated handover follows the same princi-
ple. The figure presents an overview of handover events.
Migration initiation (MI) represents that ME initiates the migration, generally with
a request to start the handover protocol. Before MI, ME is serviced by Dom-
S. Handover initiation (HI) represents that either Dom-S or Dom-T receives the
request and starts the handover protocol. Handover completion (HC) indicates the
handover protocol in the network is completed with ME’s network-resident state
being updated. Migration completion (MC) represents the ME’s migration to Dom-
T is done. At the point of MC, all migration-related events are delivered successfully
and ME is serviced by Dom-T.
Concerning seamless handover, two additional events are identified and depicted in
Figure 12, referred as old domain exit (oDom-Exit) and new domain entry (nDom-
Entry). oDom-Exit represents ME loses access to the network Dom-S. On the other
hand, nDom-Entry represents ME gains access to the network Dom-T. Both two
events are global events that are observable both at ME and at the network side.
According the events shown in Figure 12, ME is serviced by Dom-S before MI,
and after MC, ME should be guaranteed of service from Dom-T. During the interval
between MI and MC, ME may be serviced by either Dom-S, Dom-T, or both of them.













Figure 12: Major events of a handover.
In Figure 12, nDom-Entry occurs before oDom-Exit, which reflects one simple case.
In practise, nDom-Entry can occur at any time except after MC, and oDom-Exit
can occur at any time except before MI. The events that are not depicted in the
figure include the application specific ones occurring in the network which are to be
delivered to the ME, and the ones occurring at the ME which are to be delivered to
the network. The address assignment conducted at network side is implicit in the
figure, as well as the registration request initiated at ME.
Seamless handover, according to Figure 12, is thus concerned with how to provide
service in the migration interval between MI and MC. The major goal is to hide
from the application/user any difference between the service received during han-
dover and the service received inside a domain. Following our assumption that ME
can be served by either Dom-S or Dom-T during the migration interval, the following
general approaches for seamless handover are identified: Non-Coordinated Redun-
dant Service, Coordinated Redundant Service, New Domain Service, Old Domain
Service [EN02].
For Non-Coordinated Redundant Service, ME is serviced by both Dom-S and Dom-
T. The Dom-Reps in both source and target networks should be accessible during the
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migration interval to make this approach feasible. As network events are delivered by
Dom-S and Dom-T, it requires ME to be able to distinguish and discard duplicated
event deliveries. At the same time, events from ME sent to both Dom-S and Dom-T
need to be properly handled to filter out redundant ones. The Non-Coordinated
Redundant Service approach requires necessary system support such as allowing
redundant accesses to Dom-S and Dom-T between MI and MC. The network device
on ME should support multi-homing feature which allows the ME to send and
receive events to and from both Dom-S and Dom-T. This approach is mainly for
applications that require uninterrupted service such as real-time applications. One
obvious disadvantage is about the resource usage which limits this approach for
scenarios where the amount of resources is not a major concern.
Compared with Non-Coordinated Redundant Service, the Coordinated Redundant
Service approach avoids the usage of redundant resource during entire migration
interval by making Dom-S and Dom-T agree on a switching point, when the service
provision is switched from Dom-S to Dom-T, even though both sides can still pro-
vide services to ME. The crucial part of this approach lies in the synchronization
of Dom-S and Dom-T to update ME’s network state. This approach uses fewer
resources such as wireless communication bandwidth, and needs no detection or fil-
tering of duplicated events, but at the same time introduces new challenge coming
from the synchronization. To make synchronization possible, both domains need to
coordinate by following a predefined protocol.
The New Domain Service approach achieves seamless handover by requiring the
Dom-Rep of Dom-T to be the sole service point for ME during migration. This
indicates that nDom-Entry happens before the MI. As some events may be delivered
to Dom-S before the occurrence of HC, in order to ensure correctness of delivery,
the Dom-Rep in Dom-S should forward those events to Dom-T. Accordingly, Dom-
Rep in Dom-T is responsible for guranteeing the correct delivery of events to ME.
The Dom-Rep in new network should merge the stream of events that come from
Dom-S with the ones going directly to it. The main advantage of this approach is
the simplicity in implementation since the task of merging events is carried out by a
single element in network. One disadvantage is due to the extra usage of resources,
since for a certain period of time Dom-Reps in both Dom-S and Dom-T are providing
services to ME. Another disadvantage is that the event forwarding from Dom-S to
Dom-T will prolong the handover period which may affect handover performance.
The Old Domain Service approach allows the Dom-Rep of Dom-S to serve ME
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during the migration interval, which assumes the oDom-Exit happens after HC.
The Dom-Rep of Dom-S determines the occurrence of HC as well as the time when
Dom-S stops serving ME and the time when Dom-T should provide service to ME.
Essentially, this approach shares the same advantage and disadvantages as the New
Domain Service approach. The difference is that in Old Domain Service, the service
switching time is postponded. This feature makes it useful for the systems where
the handover process or the resource allocation at Dom-T comsumes more time or
it is difficult to forward a huge amount of data from Dom-S to Dom-T.
Each of the general approaches discussed is applicable for the scenarios with different
requirements. Due to the complexity of seamless handover, there are lots more to be
considered regarding to the deployment in the future wireless IP networks. Those
general approaches hence provide a high level view over the key events of seamless
handover, which help shed light on the implementation in real practice.
3.3 IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Handover
3.3.1 Overview
The performance of current mobile applications depends largely on the capacity
of underlying access technologies. Modern wireless systems usually satisfy the ser-
vice requirements within each system by guaranteeing the level of QoS regarding
to transmission delay, loss, and bandwidth [LSP08]. Meanwhile, due to the growth
of multi-interface devices and the availability of multiple wireless broadband access
technologies, how to enable mobile users to roam seamlessly and securely across
different networks has become a key issue for currently incumbent service and net-
work providers. A major challenge to be addressed concerns how to ensure the
performance of inter-technology handover in terms of latency and loss. As the op-
erational business requirements vary towards different systems, handover solutions
should provide both service providers and network providers the flexibility to im-
plement policies according to their needs. In addition, by taking into account costs,
backward compatibility, and competing business interests, the current wireless net-
working environment will remain diverse for the foreseeable future with multiple ac-
cess technologies coexisting and cooperating with each other. Supporting seamless
roaming is a key to help operators manage and thrive from the heterogeneity [T+09].
Therefore, a standardized solution is in strong need, which can facilitate seamless
handover with the capacity to cope with various mobility management mechanisms
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in such a heterogeneous multi-access environment.
The IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Handover (MIH) is an industrial driven en-
deavor to achieve seamless handover across heterogeneous access networks with its
specification standard published in January 2009 [MIH09]. The IEEE 802.21 stan-
dard provides a media independent framework with associated services to enable
inter-technology handover between IEEE 802 family networks (e.g., IEEE 802.16)
and non-IEEE 802 networks (e.g., 3GPP networks). Its goal is to improve handover
interoperability through the MIH services coordinated under a unified platform.
The motivation behind MIH is coupled with the benefit of standardization and
media independency [T+09]. As to improve handover interoperability across differ-
ent technologies, a common method is to create multiple media specific extensions
supporting interoperation. Considering two technologies T1 and T2, to allow T1
interoperate with T2, one extension is needed. The same rule applies to the exten-
sion of T2 to T1. Similarily, T1 needs one more extension if it tends to work with
T3, and T3 needs one to work with T1. Following this fashion, to ensure N kinds
of technologies to interoperate properly with each other, N × (N - 1) media specific
extensions are needed. The complexity hence grows on the order of N2. Obviously,
this approach is expensive to implement and does not scale well for environment
with multiple access technologies.
To promote efficiency and scalability, IEEE 802.21 standard defines a common media
independent framework as a unified platform for handover. This approach allows
each access technology only to implement a single extension to interoperate with
other ones through the MIH platform. The complexity is on the order of N and
scales better than the media specific approach. A set of MIH services is defined
by IEEE 802.21 to interact with higher layers of protocol stack. Each technology
thus implements one extension to ensure the interoperation with the IEEE 802.21
framework.
Concerning the scope of MIH, IEEE 802.21 defines a series of functions to facilitate
handover initiation and preparation through exchanging information, events, and
commands. IEEE 802.21 does not attempt to standardize the handover execution
mechanism, since link layer mobility is mainly handled by access specific proce-
dures, and traffic re-routing is usually performed by higher layer specifically defined
protocols. Therefore, IEEE 802.21 framework is equally applicable to systems that
employ Mobile IP at network layer and as to systems that adopt Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) at application layer.
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The heart of IEEE 802.21 framework is the Media Independen Handover Function
(MIHF). Figure 13 depicts the general architecture of MIH services and their rela-
tions with other protocol stacks. As a middle layer between higher layer mobility
management protocol stack and lower layer network access protocol stack, MIHF
offers a unified interface to upper layers with the exposed service primitives inde-
pendent of specific technologies and protocols. At the same time, MIHF obtains
services from lower layers through a set of media-dependent interfaces. The media-
dependent interfaces are specified in the standard according to the respective access
technologies including IEEE 802.3, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.16, 3GPP, and 3GPP2.
Given the link layer intelligence offered, IEEE 802.21 standard is unique among the
set of IEEE standards, as the framework not only allows the interworking within
IEEE 802 systems, but the interworking between IEEE 802 and non-IEEE 802
systems, with handover supports covering both wireless and wired systems.
MIH Function
SIP MIPv4 MIPv6 HIP SCTP …
802.16802.11 802.3 3GPP 3GPP2 …
Upper Layers (L3 and above)









Figure 13: MIH Function in IEEE 802.21 framework.
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3.3.2 Framework and services
As stated in IEEE 802.21 standard, seamless handover is a handover associated with
a link switch between points of attachment, where the mobile node either experi-
ences no degradation in service quality, security, and capabilities, or experiences
some degradation in service parameters that is mutually acceptable to the mobile
subscriber and to the network that serves the newly connected interface [MIH09].
To achieve this goal in current multi-access environment, IEEE 802.21 provides a
series of services that can support cooperative use of information available at the
mobile node and within the network infrastructure. Essentially, the IEEE 802.21
standard consists of following elements: MIH users, MIH function (MIHF), and Ser-
vice access points (SAPs). Figure 14 illustrates a general reference model defined
by IEEE 802.21.
According to the standard, a MIH user is a functional entity that employs MIH
services. It is regarded as an abstraction of consumer of MIH services. A typical
example of MIH user is a mobility management application that can use the MIH
services to optimize handovers.
The MIHF is a logical entity that includes three types of services: 1) media-
independent event service (MIES) which detects property changes in link layer and
Figure 14: General reference model of IEEE 802.21 [MIH09].
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reports events that originate from local and remote interfaces; 2) media-independent
command service (MICS) which provides a set of commands for MIH users to con-
trol link state; 3) media-independent information service (MIIS) which provides
MIH related information about the surrounding networks such as their locations
and properties. MIH services can be either local or remote with local operation con-
ducted within local protocol stack while remote operation occurring between two
MIHF entities.
The MIH SAPs define media-independent and media-dependent interfaces in terms
of primitives according to IEEE 802.21 specification. The standard does not man-
date any specific programming language to represent the primitives. The imple-
menters of MIHF are required to define specific APIs with their chosen program-
ming languages. In general, MIH SAPs include the following: 1) MIH_SAP, which
is a media-independent SAP providing a unified interface to higher layers to control
and monitor different links regardless of specific technology; 2) MIH_LINK_SAP,
which is a media-dependent SAP providing an interface to MIHF to control and
monitor a specific link; 3) MIH_NET_SAP, which is a media-dependent SAP pro-
viding transport services on the local node and supporting the message exchanging
with remote MIHF.
To facilitate handover initialization and preparation, IEEE 802.21 MIH relys on
three major services: MIES, MICS, and MIIS. To control and configure these three
type of services, IEEE 802.21 standard defines a management service, which con-
sists of MIH capability discovery, MIH registration, and MIH event subscription. By
using the primitives of management service, MIHF is capable of discovering remote
MIHF entities, and obtain services from remote entities. The MIH SAPs function as
interfaces to connect different entities. Through a unified SAP to higher layers, MIH
enables upper layer applications to have a common view across different access links.
Media-dependent SAPs (LINK_SAPs) facilitate MIHF to obtain media specific in-
formation that can be propagated to MIH users via a uniform media-independent
interface (MIH_SAP). IEEE 802.21 defines a media independent services framework
for deployment concern together with the MIH protocol. The MIH protocol enables
the communication between peer MIHF entities via the delievery of MIH protocol
messages. MIH defines the message formats including a message header and message
parameters appended. The messages correlated with the MIH primitives are used
to trigger communications. As shown in Figure 15 of the MIH services framework
and communication between a local and a remote MIHF entities, it is assumed that
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Figure 15: Communication between local and remote MIHF entities [T+09].
tity and forwarded to remote entity as remote events, commands, and information
service query-responses. To understand the core of MIH, three main services are
analyzed as follows:
Media Independent Event Servicess (MIES) - include events that represent changes
in link characteristics such as link state and link quality. Events are used to indicate
changes of state and behavior on physical, link, and logical link layers via primitives
such as LINK_Up and LINK_Down. Two main categories of events include the
ones that originate from lower link layers to be forwarded upwards (Link event) and
the ones that originate from MIHF. MIH users can subscribe to receive notification
once the corresponding events occur. Events can be local or remote. Local events
are contained within single node which can be subscribed by local MIHF. On the
other hand, remote events are subscribed by remote nodes and to be delivered over
the network following MIH protocol messages. Event notifications are sent to MIHF
or upper layer entities that either locate on a local node or on a remote one. For
instance, the LINK_Up event that is generated from the link layer is propagated
to MIH user on the same node is regarded as local event. If a remote MIH user has
subscribed to this event, the local LINK_Up event is delivered to this remote MIH
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user, as depicted in Figure 15.
Media Independent Command Servicess (MICS) - provide commands to control link
state. MIH users and MIHF can invoke commands either locally or remotely. Local
commands from the MIH users are forwarded to MIHF and from MIHF further to
lower layers. Remote commands are delivered by MIH protocol messages and can be
propagated from the MIHF in local protocol stack to the MIHF in a peer protocol
stack. As an example, an MIH user can control the reconfiguration of a link with
Link_Get_parameters. The receiver of command can be located within the protocol
stack that originates the command, or within a remote entity. Remote commands
can go to lower layers as Link command or go up to MIH users as MIH indication as
shown in Figure 15. For instance, a Link_Action command generated from MIHF
is sent to link layer of the same node when it is a local command. The command
propagated from the local MIHF to the link layer of a remote node through peer
MIHF is a remote one.
Media Independent Information Servicess (MIIS) - include a set of information ele-
ments (IEs) as well as the information structure, representation, and query-response-
based mechanism for information transfer. MIIS provide a framework for MIH
entities to discover information that can assist handover decision. For example,
information of networks within a geographical area can be obtained from MIIS to
enable effective handover decision-making and handover execution. The MIIS uses
both resource description framework (RDF) [Rec04] and type-length-value (TLV)
format to specify a media independent representation of information across different
technologies. By using RDF which is an extensible framework, MIIS can support
the creation of new IEs conforming to RDF schema. Vendor specific extensions can
be added through the extended schema namespace defined in IEEE 802.21. One
additional advantage of using RDF in MIIS is because RDF can support efficient
responding to complex queries. For instance, MIIS can thus be used efficiently to
identify neighboring networks that meet a complex set of criteria and requirements.
This feature is beneficial if comparing with the normal scheme with multiple message
exchanges that would require more bandwidth and lead to greater handover latency.
For information that is not available locally, MIH protocol can be used to access
remote information sources. The network element to store MIH related information
is referred to as information server (IS).
With the provision of MIH services to support inter-technology handovers, IEEE
802.21 is regarded as a promising solution to achieve the goal of seamless mobility.
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In order to demonstrate the capability of IEEE 802.21 MIH regarding to seamless
handover support, analysis against the five seamless handover principles is made
and summarized in Figure 16 [LSP08].
First, principle 1 is fully supported by IEEE 802.21 concerning the multi-criteria
handover decision. MIH offers the capability to collect information from mobile
nodes and network side covering all protocol stacks from physical to application
layer. Additional information can also be retrieved from the MIIS server. Second,
principle 2 is partially supported as admission control is achieved by queries to can-
didate networks, but the primitives to define resource reservation is missing. Third,
IEEE 802.21 does not consider the exchange of security context whereas QoS infor-
mation exchange is provided regarding to principle 3. Fourth, the standard does not
indicate supports of connection information such as new channel configuration, as
stated in principle 4. Finally, principle 5 is handled by the uniform RDF and exten-
sible markup language (XML) schema adopted in MIIS. However, the translation of
information between different systems is undefined.
Comparing with tight coupling solutions that are expensive and un-scalable to de-
ploy, the IEEE 802.21 Media Independent Handover is a proposal for loose coupling
Handover Principles MIH supported MIH not supported
Multi-criteria handover 
decision (1)
Application layer information, 
QoS, radio resource availability, 
link layer information
-
Admission control and 
resource reservation (2)
Admission control Resource reservation
Context transfer (3) QoS context exchange Security context 
exchange






RDF/XML schema for 
information retrieval
Translation mechanism
Figure 16: Support of seamless handover principles in IEEE 802.21 [LSP08].
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that doesn’t require the source and target systems to exhibit strong interdependency.
The success of this standard, as pointed out, depends not only upon the activities
within the IEEE 802.21 WG, but also upon the acceptance of this technology by
other standards and industy forums [T+09]. As standardizations must strike a bal-
ance between encouraging innovation and ensuring interoperability, some features
are better left for industrial parties to address, hence creating opportunities for com-
panies to distinguish themselves in the markets. At the same time, a mandatory set
of common hooks and interfaces should be in place to ensure interoperability and
allow large scale industrial deployment. The strong tie and close cooperation among
IEEE, IETF, 3GPP, and international mobile telephony (IMT) advanced communi-
ties, as well as the extensible feature of IEEE 802.21, constitute a good base for the
future success of IEEE 802.21 MIH standard.
4 Handover Security in Wireless Networks
As a key part of mobility management, handover management entails the task of
transferring essential user context between two access networks, which in principle,
must be conducted in a secure manner. However, due to the fact that existing
security solutions add complexity and overhead to handover management, it is de-
manding to achieve both efficiency and security at the same time [C+08]. To under-
stand the security impact on handover, we provide a general discussion on essential
security technique involved in handover management, covering the authentication,
authorization, and accounting (AAA) framework, and the key management. Our
focus is to analyze existing security schemes that can be utilized to secure handover
within a well defined security enhanced wireless network.
4.1 Security in wireless and mobile environment
4.1.1 Authentication, authorization, and accounting
Given the untrustworthy nature of wireless and mobile environment, the security
guarantee of network access is indispensable. With the increasing popularity of
mobile services, mobile users often need to be attached to new domains convenient
to their current locations [Per00]. To enable secure access for such mobile users, one
key technique that is widely deployed nowadays is the authentication, authorization,
and accounting (AAA) framework.
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For current wireless and mobile networks, AAA provides a primary architecture
for access control that ensures the mobility not to happen at the places without
permission. When a mobile user needs to access an administrative domain that is
not his or her home domain, the service providers in such foreign domain need a
proper authorization to guarantee valid service for this visiting user. This directly
leads to the authentication of user’s identity as well as the accounting for billing and
auditing purposes. By integrating logically three security services into a coherent
framework, AAA supports security in a consistent manner.
To enable the dynamic configuration of access control, AAA adopts a modular way
to perform security services through three major functions: authentication, autho-
rization, and accounting. The authentication function in AAA provides methods to
identify users who intend to obtain the access to system or network. By definition,
authentication is the binding of an identity to a subject [Bis02]. The network-based
authentication requires the subject e.g. mobile user to provide necessary informa-
tion that can enable the system to confirm its identity. In principle, authentication
consists of the user and the verifier. When a user attempts to confirm his identity
to the verifier, he needs to provide one (or more) of the following information: 1)
what the user knows, such as passwords or shared secret information; 2) what the
user has, such as ID card or digital signature; 3) what the user is, such as biometric
measures; and 4) where the user is, such as the location in the lab. According to
the authentication policy, the verifier will validate the user’s claim with auxiliary
equipment. The authentication policy defines whether an authentication should be
done and which mechanisms and algorithms should be applied. Concerning the
AAA system, the security server functions as the verifier for the service users.
The authorization function in AAA provides methods to verify and grant rights and
restrictions entitled to each user. The authorization policy is a key term of AAA au-
thorization to define the condition and manner for corresponding actions performed
by the user. The policy decision can be either positive or negative, permitting or
prohibiting the action, respectively. The network-based authorization adopts the
attribute-value (AV) pairs in its security data base to associate the specific right
with the appropriate user under certain conditions. The attribute types in AAA
authorization include the network access, IP address assignment, and QoS support,
etc. The form of such authorization AV pairs can be described as ’subject S is al-
lowed to perform action A on object O under the condition C’ [R+01]. Based on the
authentication result, AAA authorization works by assembling the set of attributes
which describe what a user is authorized to perform, and comparing them to the
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information in security data base. The result is returned to AAA to determine the
actual capabilities and restrictions for each user according to the predefined autho-
rization policies, which take into account technical (e.g., available bandwidth) and
financial (e.g., remaining credit) aspects.
The accounting function in AAA provides methods to collect and aggregate informa-
tion from each user regarding to their service utilization. The information recorded
covers user identity, service type, service duration, executed commands, and size of
traffic, etc. The accounting function enables the system to track the service and
network resources consumed by each authorized user. When AAA accounting is
activated, the responsible entity e.g., a network access server (NAS) which functions
as the point of attachment to the domain will report accounting records to the AAA
server. Following the format defined in corresponding AAA protocols, accounting
records can be used to assist network management, service billing, auditing and
trend analysis.
To coordinate three AAA functions, different AAA protocols are proposed by IETF
for various application scenarios. The major AAA services are defined by AAA
protocol in terms of message format, extensions, error handling, and generic system
architecture. In current mobile networks, RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial
In User Service) [R+97] and Diameter [C+03] are two AAA protocols enjoying wide
deployment.
As a centralized access management protocol, RADIUS protocol is designed origi-
nally for the dial-up connections of telecommunication systems. It defines protocol
operations and message formats for transferring authentication, authorization, and
configuration data between network access server (NAS) and RADIUS server. A
NAS in RADIUS functions as a client to communicate with other RADIUS servers,
which hold information for authentication and authorization. A RADIUS server
can act as a client to other RADIUS servers in order to exchange AAA information.
The accounting support is defined in an extension to deliver accounting records to
RADIUS accounting server [Rig97].
As the successor of RADIUS, Diameter protocol is proposed to remove some defi-
ciencies of RADIUS such as weak user-password protection [M+01a]. By providing
a base protocol for header formats, extensions, mandatory commands, and attribute
value pairs (AVPs), Diameter is regarded as a flexible and extensible AAA proto-
col [C+03]. The AAA functionality is implemented through Diameter extensions














Figure 17: AAA architecture [L+00].
which is referred to as Diameter application defines special command codes and
AVPs to implement specific functions. To support mobility, Diameter includes an
extension for Mobile IP which supports the mobility of mobile users across differ-
ent domains [C+05a]. Different from RADIUS, Diameter uses reliable transport
protocol such as TCP or SCTP instead of UDP. Although Diameter is not fully
compatible with RADIUS, its NAS application extension [C+05b] supports the RA-
DIUS authentication as well as the authorization needed by NAS services. The
extensible feature as well as mobility and security enhancement make Diameter a
suitable protocol of AAA services for the next generation IP based networks.
A key assumption for the current AAA architecture is the multi-domain network
topology where each administrative domain resides at least one AAA server. Dis-
tributed servers cooperate with each other to offer AAA services to users inside
the network [R+01]. As illustrated in Figure 17, the existing architecture of AAA
consists of functional components, AAA policies and three AAA services (authen-
tication, authorization, and accounting). Different components are combined to-
gether by various protocols. The policy based model is adopted to assist inter-
organizational operations, in which an AAA policy is defined as an aggregation of
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rules made up of conditions and corresponding actions [M+01b].
The essential components in the AAA architecture include Rule-Based Engine (RBE),
Policy Repository (PR), Application-Specific Module (ASM), and Service Equip-
ment (SE). Rule-Based Engine (RBE) is a central component residing in the AAA
server, which evaluates conditions, makes a decision and executes actions according
to AAA policies. Policy Repository (PR) stores the AAA policies to be used by
AAA services. Application-Specific Module (ASM) is an interface between AAA
server and Service Equipment (SE) which receives and delivers messages from both
sides. SE is the equipment providing services to the user.
When AAA server receives a request from SE via ASM, or directly from other AAA
servers, the request is inspected by RBE, which consults the PR for AAA policies.
To evaluate policy conditions, other AAA servers may be consulted through direct
communication between two servers using an AAA protocol such as Diameter. Take
the mobile networks for example, ASM is realized as an access point or NAS in
home or foreign domain, while SE is the mobile node. The ASM forwards the access
request to the AAA server to authenticate the user. Based on the response from
AAA server, ASM accepts or rejects user’s request. The PR holds essential user in-
formation which is used by AAA server. The information includes user session state,
accounting data, and log actions, etc. Concerning the mobility aspect, the security
and trust relationship between different AAA entities are crucial. To authenticate
and authorize user in a foreign domain, the trust relationship should be maintained
along the chain of servers that belong to both home and foreign domains [V+00].
4.1.2 Key management
The management of cryptographic keys plays a critical role in security. Because
information security protected by cryptography not only relies on the strength of
cryptographic algorithms, but also on the protection mechanisms and protocols as-
sociated with the keys, a poor design of key management may even compromise
strong algorithms, leading to the failure of whole cryptographic system. This cru-
cial fact implies that cryptographic keys should be protected against modification
and unauthorized disclosure during their lifetime. A proper key management pro-
vides a secure foundation for the generation, storage, distribution, and destruction
of cryptographic keys.
In current cryptographic system, key management refers to the distribution of cryp-
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tographic keys; the mechanisms used to bind an identity to a key; and the generation,
maintenance, and revoking of such keys [Bis02]. One assumption on which key man-
agement relies is that the identity can correctly define the principal, implying that a
key bound to a user A is really A’s key rather than that of user B. This assumption
is based on the authentication of principal’s identity and the proper identity rep-
resentation. The discussion of identity representation can be found in the related
document [Bis02], and its content is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Concerning the central component of key management, a cryptographic key is a
parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines its
operation in such a way that an entity with knowledge of the key can reproduce or
reverse the operation, while an entity without knowledge of the key cannot [B+07].
The secrecy provided by cryptographic system resides in the generation and selection
of keys. In order to prevent attackers from guessing the keys, the key generation
process is implemented by a random number generator to produce keys that are
theoretically unpredictable and irreproducible. Normally a cryptographic key is
attached to an expiration date, which determines the lifetime of the key to be used
in the cryptographic system.
For network security, the differences between the communication and the principals
e.g. users distinct two types of keys: interchange keys and session keys. By defi-
nition, an interchange key is a cryptographic key associated with a principal to a
communication, while a session key is a cryptographic key associated with the com-
munication itself [Bis02]. Compared with the session key, the interchange key does
not change over communication sessions, which makes it ideal to be used in authen-
tication. The session key is generated and used for each communication session and
discarded when the session ends. Session keys are used mostly for the encryption of
data transfer and normally do not authenticate any principal.
Identified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [NIS09],
the life circle of key management can be divided into 4 phases as depicted in Figure
18, including pre-operational phase, operational phase, post-operational phase, and
destroyed phase [B+07]. In pre-operational phase, keying materials are not available
for cryptographic usage and are under the generation process. In operational phase,
keying materials are available for cryptographic operations such as key exchange,
data encryption, and data decryption. In post-operational phase, the keys are no
longer used while the access to keying materials may still be possible. Keys of the

















Figure 18: Key management phases [B+07].
available and all related records are deleted.
According to the flow diagram in Figure 18, seven transitions are identified, in which
keys shall not be able to transfer back to any previous phase. For transition 1, the
cryptographic key is generated, but it is not authorized to be used; For transition
2, once the required key attributes are established, key is ready to be used and
distributed; For transition 3, when keys are no longer needed for normal use such
as encryption, but access to the keys needs to be maintained, the management
procedure will go to the post-operational phase; For transition 4, when the key
in post-operational phase is no longer needed, it will go to the destroyed phase;
Transition 5 and 6 deal with the case that if a key is compromised, the management
procedure will go to the post-operational phase; For transition 7, keys that are
produced but never used will be destroyed by directly going from the pre-operational
phase to the destroyed phase.
For key management, one fundamental concept is the cryptographic key infrastruc-
ture which provides necessary support for key operations in cryptographic systems.
The cryptographic key infrastructure is responsible for regulating the key-identity
binding, selecting security algorithms, and implementing key exchange protocols.
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In current cryptographic key infrastructure, key exchange protocols are essential to
guarantee the safety of key distribution. The goal of key exchange protocol is to
enable secure communication between two parties basing on the long term trust.
To achieve this goal, solutions to key exchange protocol should meet three criteria:
1) the key in use can not be transmitted in clear text; 2) a trusted third party in
key infrastructure may be used; 3) the cryptographic algorithms and protocols are
publicly known, while the only secret data is the cryptographic keys involved [Bis02].
Currently, the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) [Kau05] is a standard key
exchange protocol used in Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) architecture [KS05] to
enable secure key exchange. The major task of IKEv2 for IPsec is to set up security
association (SA), which is a set of cryptographic methods and associated key mate-
rials to be used by IPsec for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [Ken05b] and/or
Authentication Header (AH) [Ken05a] used for data encryption and authentication,
respectively.
As illustrated in Figure 19, the operation of IKEv2 consists of two phases that are re-
ferred to as IKE phase 1 and IKE phase 2. In IKE phase 1, the main goal is to estab-
lish a secure and authenticated channel between two communicating peers. IKEv2
Node A
Internet
Node A and B negotiate an IKE phase 1 session
Node B




IKE SA IKE SA
IPsec SA IPsec SA
Information exchange over IPsec tunnel
Figure 19: IKEv2 operation.
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performs mutual authentication by using the long term shared trust held by each
peer to validate peer identity. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [Res99] is
used in phase 1 to generate a shared secret key to encrypt further IKEv2 communi-
cation. The negotiation in phase 1 results in a shared bi-directional IKE SA on both
peers that is used to set up secure communication channel. In IKE phase 2, by using
the existing IKE SA established in phase 1, communicating peers negotiate IPsec SA
parameters through the secure channel. The phase 2 negotiation yields a minimum
of two uni-directional IPsec SAs, one inbound and one outbound, respectively, for
IPsec operation. Once the IKEv2 negotiation is complete, further communication
between peers is protected by IPsec by going through the secure tunnel.
Since the characteristics of different cryptographic systems vary from each other, key
exchange protocols should follow specific requirements to reach the corresponding
goals. For AAA key management, one major goal is to distribute keying materials
to entities in the situations where key derivation can not be used by such entities e.g.
a wireless access point, because such entities may lack the resources necessary to
implement various authentication mechanisms required, or it is undesirable for each
entity to engage in a separate key management conversation [HA07]. For classical
cryptographic systems, where principals share a common trusted key, key agree-
ment is often used. In such environment, key agreement enables the communication
principals to establish keying materials based on the information contributed by the
principals without actually sending the keying materials. The shared symmetric key
in classical cryptographic system is used to calculate shared secrets and then derive
other keying materials for further use. Only approved key agreement schemes shall
be used in such cases [B+07].
4.1.3 Security requirement for wireless mobility
To enable secure data communication, security requirements are needed to regulate
design and implementation. Based on previous research efforts for decades, major
security requirements for data communication can be summarized as follows: 1)
confidentiality is necessary for secure communication which provides resistance to
interception and eavesdropping; 2) authentication guarantees the integrity of data
and the identity of principal, corresponding to data modification and impersonation;
3) anti-replay helps detect message that is a replay of previous session; 4) non-
repudiation prevents denial and fabrication; 5) access control prevents unauthorized
access; 6) availability ensures the resources are always accessible [XMH06, Sta06,
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Bis02].
Because wireless communication is based on transmitting signals via electromagnetic
waves over unbounded media, this nature enables the pervasiveness of data trans-
mission regardless of physical boundaries. Nevertheless, as wireless communication
is conducted over such open channel, it suffers from a number of vulnerabilities such
as eavesdropping, identity cheating, and data modification [BH07]. These challenges
make security issue a key concern in wireless networks.
At the same time, the fast growing popularity of mobile services demands a careful
design of security solutions for existing wireless environment. As mobile users move
frequently across different wireless domains with their devices running applications,
this dynamic change of location and environmental context bring challenges to the
existing security solutions. Besides the fundamental security requirements, security
solutions in a wireless and mobile environment should also take the mobility aspects
into account.
In general, security approaches supporting mobility should obey basic principles that
are believed to be crucial to the suitability and acceptance of mobility protocols
in wireless networks. The principles contain the following elements as efficiency,
scalability, transparency, and manageability: 1) for efficiency, it demands that the
design should induce little overhead and computing requirement; 2) for scalability, it
demands that the scheme should be able to work in networks with many mobile users
and frequent handovers; 3) for transparency, it demands that the implementation
should bring as little changes as possible to existing systems, especially to mobile
terminals; 4) for manageability, it requires that the mechanisms and protocols should
be managed efficiently without complicated operations [M+00].
As the general solution to wireless mobility, mobility protocols such as Mobile IP ex-
ert huge impact on the security infrastructure and key management. Concerning the
widely deployed AAA infrastructure, new components are introduced to the archi-
tecture to integrate with mobility protocols, including the AAA Broker, local AAA
authority, and home AAA authority, as shown in Figure 20. Such changes generate
new security requirements to both AAA entities as well as AAA key management.
Take Mobile IP for example, in order to provide better mobility support, IETF has
identified essential requirements that integrate security implementations with Mo-
bile IP [G+00]. The key elements are summarized as follows: 1) Mobile node (MN)
and AAA home entity need to authenticate each other before access is permitted. A
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Figure 20: AAA architecture using a broker [G+00].
Each local attendant such as an access point should have a security relationship with
the local AAA server; 3) The local authority has to share security relationship with
external authorities that are able to validate customer credentials; 4) The atten-
dant has to protect against reply attacks; 5) To keep the mobile node’s credentials
safe, intervening nodes such as attendants or local AAA server must not learn any
confidential information which might compromise the credentials; 6) For scenarios
where one attendant need to manage requests from many customers at the same
time, the attendant should be easy and inexpensive to implement, so that it can
be replicated in the foreign domain to handle multiple requests; 7) The local AAA
server has to share or dynamically establish security associations with home AAA
server. To provide a scalable solution, AAA broker entity may be used, which has
SAs with both local AAA and home AAA server. AAA broker can act as a proxy
between local AAA and home AAA and relay shared secret key to them in order to
set up SA; 8) After successful authentication, MN is allowed to access the network
and use services such as mobility protocol functionality; 9) AAA protocol should
enable transport of mobility related messages, e.g. Mobile IP registration, as part of
the initial registration sequence to be handled by AAA server. Any mobility related
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message transported via AAA entities should be considered opaque to AAA system;
10) For handover within one administrative domain, local AAA server should be
able to provide necessary authentication without involving the home AAA server;
11) For handover between different administrative domains, local AAA server in
new domain may contact AAA server in previous domain to verify authenticity of
customers and/or obtain session keys for security operations.
Concerning the key management within AAA framework, security requirements are
needed for current wireless networks with diverse protocols employed. To improve
interoperability, the following requirements constitute a good base for security de-
signers covering essential aspects of AAA based key management: 1) Cryptographic
algorithm independent, which requires that AAA key management protocol must
be cryptographic algorithm independent, so that possible cryptographic algorithms
can be negotiated and selected to provide resilience against compromise of a partic-
ular cryptographic algorithm; 2) Strong and fresh session keys, which requires that
session keys must be strong and fresh, with each session deserving an independent
session key so that the disclosure of one session key does not aid the attacker in
discovering any other session keys; 3) Limit key scope, which requires that entities
must not have access to keying material that is not needed to perform their role;
4) Replay detection mechanism, which requires that key exchange must be replay
protected to enable the recipient to discard any message that was recorded during
a previous legitimate dialogue and presented as though it belonged to the current
dialogue; 5) Authenticate all parties, which requires that each entity in the key man-
agement protocol must be authenticated to others with whom it communicates; 6)
Peer and authenticator authorization, which requires that peer and authenticator
authorization must be performed and entities must demonstrate possession of the
appropriate keying material, without disclosing it; 7) Keying material confidentiality
and integrity, which requires that confidentiality and integrity of all keying material
must be maintained; 8) Confirm ciphersuite selection requires that the selection of
the "best" ciphersuite should be securely confirmed; 9) Uniquely named keys, which
requires that all keys must be uniquely named, and the key name must not directly
or indirectly disclose the keying material; 10) Prevent the Domino effect, which re-
quires that compromise of a single entity must not compromise keying material held
by any other entities within the system; 11) Bind key to its context, which requires
that keying material must be bound to the appropriate context. The discussions of
key management security can be found in related IETF document [HA07], while its
details are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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4.2 Handover security
Handover security guarantees a safe transfer of critical context for mobile users mov-
ing across different wireless access networks. To offer rich and safe mobile services
in the upcoming wireless IP networks with heterogeneous accesses, organizations
including IETF and IEEE propose solutions for handover security, covering access
authentication, key management, and secure IP mobility. Meanwhile, 3GPP works
on the architecture framework to integrate various protocols required by handover
security. By studying major protocols and architecture, we analyze the security
impact on handover in terms of system performance.
4.2.1 Handover security schemes
Due to the resource constraints on mobile devices, security mechanisms for han-
dover should be designed carefully to avoid negative impact on performance and
energy consumption while preserving the security at a satisfactory level. In the past
decade, a number of schemes have been introduced by the Standards Developing
Organizations (SDO) such as IEEE, IETF, and 3GPP to enhance handover secu-
rity. As a base for existing handover security mechanisms, their contributions can
be summerized into three categories: access authentication, key management, and
secure IP mobility.
As the first step of handover security, access authentication enables the access control
of network resources by validating the identity of entities involved in a handover. A
typical access authentication in wireless and mobile environment takes place between
a mobile node and its corresponding authentication server supported by authenti-
cation protocols. Currently, the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [A+04]
proposed by IETF provides a flexible and extensible framework to utilize various
authentication implementations and becomes a standard protocol for access au-
thentication in existing wireless networks.
By defining a base protocol to transport authentication messages, EAP can be used
for both wired and wireless links. It operates in a peer-to-peer manner where in-
dependent and simultaneous authentication can take place on both ends of the link
at the same time. As EAP adopts the lock-step mechanism, which supports only
a single packet in flight, it is not suitable for bulk data transport. For network
access authentication where IP connectivity may not be available, EAP supports
message transport without requiring IP [80204]. At the same time, EAP provides
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its own mechanisms for retransmission and duplicate elimination while the message
ordering is expected from the lower layer. For protocol function, the following terms
are introduced by EAP: EAP method, authenticator, peer, backend authentication
server, and EAP server [A+04].
First, as illustrated in Figure 21, an EAP method is the mechanism for a specific
authentication implementation. Because EAP does not provide specific authentica-
tion mechanisms, the EAP method is the implementation of security schemes and
algorithms. Currently, multiple methods are developed by SDOs, such as the Ex-
tensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) [SAH08] for
WLAN and the Extensible Authentication Protocol Authentication and Key Agree-
ment (EAP-AKA) [AH06, ALE09] for 3G networks. Second, an authenticator in
EAP is the end of the link that initiates the EAP authentication, which usually
is an access point or a gateway router. Third, a peer is the end of the link that
responds to the authenticator. Fourth, a backend authentication server is the en-
tity that provides authentication services to the authenticator by executing EAP
methods. Fifth, EAP server is the entity that terminates the EAP authentication
method with the peer. As an abstract concept, there are two cases for the EAP
server: for the case where no backend authentication server is used, EAP server is
part of the authenticator, and for the case where authenticator operates as a relay
agent for the backend authentication server, EAP server is located on the backend
authentication server.
Nowadays, EAP has been implemented on hosts and routers that connect to Internet
through switch circuits or dial-up lines with PPP [Sim94, A+04]. IEEE adopts EAP
in many of its standards such as the IEEE 802.1X [80204] for IEEE 802 wired media,
and IEEE 802.11i [IEE07] for IEEE 802.11 wireless media. Regarding the protocol
stack and operations, Figure 21 presents an example of EAP stack working with
IEEE 802 wireless systems and EAP packet format.
As shown in the figure, the authenticator works in the pass-through mode, which is
required by the AAA protocols such as Diameter EAP application [EHZ05]. EAP
messages are encapsulated using specific protocol such as the Extensible Authenti-
cation Protocol over LAN (EAPoL) [80204] and are transmitted between peer and
authenticator via the lower layer data link protocol such as IEEE 802.11 [IEE07].
Between the authenticator and the EAP server, AAA protocols such as Diameter
protocol [C+03] are used to transport authentication messages via TCP/IP.
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Figure 21: EAP protocol stack with IEEE 802 networks [A+04].
sented in Figure 22 (a) as an example. In general, EAP authentication proceeds
by the following four general steps: 1) authenticator sends a request to the peer;
2) peer sends a response to authenticator in reply to a valid request. If backend
authentication server is used, the response will be forwarded further to the backend
authentication server; 3) authenticator or backend authentication server sends addi-
tional request messages and peer replies with response. This exchange continues as
long as needed, and after a pre-defined number of rounds, authenticator or backend
authentication server will end the conversation; 4) based on the previous exchange
of authentication messages, authenticator or backend authentication server will send
the final message as EAP Success or EAP Failure to the peer.
In EAP-AKA full authentication, AKA method [3GP09] is adopted and encapsu-
lated in EAP packet to provide mutual authentication. As shown in Figure 22 (b),
every EAP packet begins with the 5-byte ’Code’, ’Identifier’, ’Length’, and ’Type’
fields. EAP method specific Type-Data fields immediately follow the basic EAP
header fields. For EAP-AKA, the Type-Data begins with the EAP-AKA header
which consists of 1-byte ’Subtype’ field and 2-byte ’Reserved’ field. Following the
EAP-AKA header, the rest of Type-Data consists of various attributes that take the
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Mobile Node Authenticator EAP server
EAP request / Identity
EAP request / AKA–Challenge (full authentication)
EAP response / AKA–Challenge (full authentication)
EAP–Success
EAP response / Identity EAP response / Identity
0                   1                   2                   3   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|     Code      |  Identifier   |            Length             |   
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|     Type      |    Subtype    |           Reserved            |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   
|Attribute Type |    Length     |           Value...   
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
(a)  EAP-AKA full authentication
(b)  EAP-AKA packet format
Figure 22: (a) EAP-AKA full authentication; (b) packet format [AH06].
generic TLV form with ’Type’, ’Length’, and ’Value’ fields.
As depicted in Figure 22, an EAP-AKA full authentication starts with an EAP-
request sent from authenticator to MN, in which the ’Code’ field is set to 1 and
’Subtype’ field is set to 5 indicating an EAP-AKA Identity request. Once receiving
the EAP-request/Identity message, MN replies with an EAP-response containing
its network identity recognizable in the system. The EAP-response/Identity mes-
sage from the MN will be forwarded to the EAP server by the authenticator, where
authenticator is functioned in the pass-through mode. After obtaining MN’s iden-
tity, EAP server sends an EAP-request/AKA-Challenge to the MN to start the
AKA mutual authentication process. When the EAP-request/AKA-Challenge from
EAP server is verified as valid, MN replies with an EAP-response/AKA-Challenge
indicating that MN has successfully authenticated the EAP server and this EAP
exchange will be accepted by MN’s local policy. If EAP server verifies the attributes
of MN’s reply as valid, EAP server will send a final EAP-Success message to the
authenticator, confirming the successful authentication and authorizing the access
right of MN.
The advantages of using EAP in access authentication lies in its flexible framework,
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in which the authenticator devices such as access point do not need to understand
each authentication method and can simply relay the messages to the corresponding
backend authentication server. The separation of the authenticator from the backend
authentication server allows one server to serve many authenticators, which eases
the management of security policy. This separation also centralizes the decision
making and keeps the complexity and cost of each authenticator low. By acting
in the pass-through mode, access points do not need frequent upgrades for all the
upcoming authentication methods. At the same time, it should be noted that this
separation complicates the security analysis and brings management overhead such
as key management.
Besides access authentication, another critical issue in handover security is the key
management. Because all authentication and integrity checks involve the key oper-
ation, how to derive and distribute keys safely in a distributed environment is chal-
lenging. Currently, 3GPP is working on its System Architecture Evolution (SAE)
/ Long Term Evolution (LTE) [3GP08a, 3GP08b] that aims at integrating multiple
wireless access technologies to deliver rich and secure services. Two main protocols
are proposed for SAE/LTE to handle authentication and key distribution during
the handover: Universal Mobile Telecommunications System Authentication and
Key Agreement (UMTS-AKA) [3GP09] and Extensible Authentication Protocol Au-
thentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA) [AH06] with its latest enhancement
EAP-AKA’ [ALE09]. Both UMTS-AKA and EAP-AKA enable mutual authentica-
tion and key distribution for handover security.
For key management of access authentication, the trust relationship between differ-
ent networking entities can be summarized as follows [Nak07]: Peer-Server, Authenticator-
Server, and Peer-Authenticator. The Peer-Server relationship has two aspects, per-
manent and transient. Permanent relationship is based on the credentials that are
configured for peers at the time of subscription. The transient one with limited life
time is based on the master session key (MSK) and extended master session key
(EMSK) that are created as a result of successful authentication between the peer
and server. The Authenticator-Server relationship is a permanent trust, which is
based on the existing AAA infrastructure, where the AAA security is provided by
lower layer IPsec [KS05] or TLS [DR08]. The Peer-Authenticator relationship is a
dynamic one, which needs to be established during the handover. For scalability,
peers share long term trust only with the server, but when needed, transient shared
keys are established dynamically between the peer and authenticator for secure com-
munication.
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To illustrate the operations of access authentication and key management in wireless
and mobile environment, Figure 23 presents a general EAP based procedure adopted
by 802.11i, 802.1X, and 802.16e for handover security. As shown in the Figure 23, the
first phase of security capability discovery is to allow the peer e.g. a mobile node to
obtain necessary information from authenticator for initiating access authentication.
In this phase, although peer and authenticator are exchanging messages, none of
the entities are authenticated nor do they obtain the keys. The second phase is
for authentication and key generation, where mutual authentication is fulfilled by
authentication schemes such as EAP-AKA and UMTS-AKA. The key generation is
done at this phase for the transient keys that will be used for the communication
session. The third phase is for key delivery and derivation, where after the second
phase, peer and server already obtain enough information to derive the session keys.
The EAP server will distribute the derived session key to the authenticator. The
fourth phase is for the negotiation between peer and authenticator on additional
keys that can be used for communication security, with an example of the temporal
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Figure 23: Key management in EAP based authentication [IEE07].
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Finally for secure IP mobility, existing IP mobility schemes all demand authentica-
tion of both parties in a handover as well as secure transport of signaling messages.
By enabling authentication and encryption of IP packet, IPsec [KS05] provides suf-
ficient security support required by the current IP based mobile environment. Con-
cerning the handover phase where the mobile node moves into a new network, the
registration and binding update should be transported to corresponding entities ei-
ther in the local network or the home network for mobility management. In order
to achieve secure handover for such IP mobility, IKEv2 [Kau05] is used by IPsec
to mutually authenticate and dynamically establish IKE security association (SA)
on the communicating parties. Based on the information exchange protected by
IKE SA, network entities can derive IPsec SAs for Encapsulating Security Pay-
load (ESP) [Ken05b] and/or Authentication Header (AH) [Ken05a] and a set of
cryptographic algorithms to be used to protect the following IP mobility manage-
ment traffic. In Proxy Mobile IP [G+08, LYC08], IPsec and IKEv2 are mandatory
components to secure the PMIP management signaling. The details of IKEv2 op-
eration in IPsec for mobility management can be found from related RFC docu-
ments [Kau05, KT06, Ero06, DE07, DE08], and the details are beyond the scope of
this thesis.
4.2.2 2-Phase model of handover security
Taking into account the growing demand for secure and high quality services on
current mobile systems with limited resources and capabilities, security implemen-
tations on such systems need to consider to what extent the performance will be
affected [ONY03]. For handover management, the main challenge lies in how to
achieve a balance between security and performance for a handover. Because the
answer to this challenge can shed light on the design and development of future
handover security schemes, an in-depth analysis of the security impact is hence of
great value as a guideline to promote the overall understanding of this challenging
topic.
To analyze the security impact, we identify two general phases of handover security
in existing wireless and mobile networks: the phase of secure connectivity and the
phase of secure reachability. In our 2-Phase model, the first secure connectivity
phase represents the access authentication with key distribution when a mobile
node attaches to a network. By passing the authentication, mobile node gains the
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Figure 24: Two phases of handover security.
reachability, key exchange protocol is adopted to set up security associations (SA)
to protect the mobility management signaling, e.g. registration and binding update
in Mobile IP. Mobility management messages and AAA queries are included in the
second phase as integrated parts of handover. Once the mobile node successfully
passes two phases, its handover process is complete. A communication tunnel is
established between mobile node and its home network, hence making the mobile
node fully reachable by other entities in the network.
Regarding the protocol operation in our 2-Phase model, Figure 24 depicts the major
message flows in a typcial wireless access network with involved networking entities
including the mobile node, authenticator, authentication server, AAA server, foreign
agent, and home agent.
In the first phase of secure connectivity, the main goal is to authenticate correspond-
ing entities in the network including mobile node, authenticator, and authentication
server. The access authentication starts with the ’security discovery’ between MN
and corresponding authenticator, in which authentication related parameters such as
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supported algorithms and lifetime of keys are negotiated and agreed. The key deriva-
tion and distribution are carried out by key management protocols together with
the access authentication process during the ’authentication and key generation’
exchange. Mutual authentication and key management are supported by technol-
ogy specific protocols, such as EAP-AKA and UMTS-AKA [AH06, 3GP09] adopted
in 3G networks, and EAP-TLS [SAH08] used in WiFi networks. Between the au-
thenticator and authentication server, the transport of authentication messages is
conducted over AAA protocols such as RADIUS or DIAMETER [R+97, C+03].
Once the authentication server successfully authenticates the mobile node, confir-
mation will be sent to the authenticator along with necessary information to derive
session keys. Based on the answer from the authentication server, authenticator will
initiate link specific negotiation with mobile node to configure link parameters used
for data encryption and/or privacy protection over the wireless access, such as the
Privacy and Key Management Protocol version 2 (PKMv2) [Man02, XMH06] used
in 802.16e networks.
In the second phase of secure reachability, the main goal is to set up necessary
security association (SA) on peer entities to protect their mobility management
signaling. For IP mobility, peer authentication is supported by IPsec and key ex-
change protocols such as IKEv2 [Kau05]. By using IKEv2, communicating peers
are authenticated in the first IKE phase in order to set up IKE SAs on each peer.
Protected by the previously established IKE SAs, the IPsec SA is established in
the second IKE phase. Once the IPsec SAs are established on both peers, mobility
management signaling such as registration and binding update in Mobile IP can be
transported securely though IPsec tunnel. To obtain user credential and validate
mobility management messages, home agent (HA) consults the AAA server in the
home network through AAA protocols. Based on the response from the AAA server,
HA will make the decision to conduct IP mobility operations. By passing the two
phases of handover security, the mobile node obtains the access right to the network
with an established IP communication tunnel enabling its reachability in the IP
network.
It should be noted that the entities and signaling depicted in Figure 24 represent
only their logical meaning for the sake of simplicity to convey a general view, while
the implementations in real practice may vary in different cases. A typical example
in Mobile IP is that the authenticator and the foreign agent (FA) may locate on
different devices instead of on the same one as depicted in this figure. The major
entities and relationships described in Figure 24 form a general framework for our
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analysis of handover security in IP mobility.
4.2.3 Security impact
As a key part in handover security, the trust relationship between different network
entities affect all aspects of security implementations including authentication, key
management, AAA operation, and protocol design. Based on the 2-Phase model,
we highlight the major relationships between communicating peers in Figure 25 to
illustrate their security impact.
In secure connectivity phase, a long term trust exists between a MN and its au-
thentication server. The authentication of MN is based on this long term trust.
An example of this relation can be found between a mobile subscriber and his 3G
network, where a contract is made between this subscriber and his operator with
shared credentials for access authentication. Between the authenticator and the au-
thentication server, the trust relationship is provided by the infrastructure where













Figure 25: Trust relationship of handover security.
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tor, the trust relationship is a temporary one which needs to be built on demand.
The key management of this phase is based on the long term trust between MN and
authentication server. Various session keys are derived from the master key of long
term trust, and further distributed to corresponding entities to set up temporary
trust relationship for the purposes of integrity and confidentiality protection.
In secure reachability phase, MN has a long term trust with its home network con-
sist of home agent (HA) and AAA server. When MN starts exchanging mobility
management messages with its home network, this long term trust is used to au-
thenticate and authorize the MN. Within the home network, the trust relationship
between HA and AAA server is guaranteed by the home network service provider
to ensure the security and interoperability of different mobility schemes. The trust
relationship between the foreign agent (FA) and HA is a dynamic one that requires
authentication to be set up. In the case of IKEv2 protocol for IP mobility, IKEv2
enables the mutual authentication between FA and HA to set up the IKE SAs. The
IKE SAs are used further to set up IPsec SAs to protect the transport of mobility
management signaling. Between MN and FA, the trust relation requires authentica-
tion to be set up, and its establishment in real practice depends highly on the link
technologies in use.
In recent heterogeneous networking environment with multiple access technologies
and network vendors, security policies and agreements among different networks
bring complexity to handover security management. Since different network ven-
dors can choose different cryptographic algorithms and AAA protocols according
to their needs, potential interoperability problems may arise when inter-technology
handovers across different vendor networks occur.
As previous research has pointed out that handover security schemes can degrade
performance due to the overhead introduced by authentication, key management,
and cryptographic operations [ONY03, PK04, LW05, AW07], in order to understand
the correlations between handover security and performance, we identify the follow-
ing performance aspects that are affected by existing handover security schemes:
handover completion time, throughput, and quality of service (QoS).
Firstly, the handover completion time is the period between the start and the end of
a handover, which determines how fast a mobile node can obtain its connectivity and
reachability in the network. The overall handover completion time is affected by the
latency introduced by security implementations in terms of access authentication,
SA establishment, AAA operation, encryption/decryption, and key management.
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Among various factors leading to handover latency, access authentication is regarded
as the most critical one contributing towards the performance degradation in a
wireless network with high mobility user running real-time applications [AW07].
To guarantee strong protection, mutual authentication is adopted by a number of
existing authentication protocols such as EAP-AKA and EAP-TLS. As described
in the 2-Phase model, since more authentication messages are needed for mutual
authentication, the extra processing time on transmission and identity validation
will prolong the completion time of secure connectivity phase. This directly leads
to the delay of handover completion time.
In the secure reachability phase, SA establishment is needed to distribute shared
secrets to corresponding entities for cryptographic purposes. As to IP mobility, in
order to negotiate IPsec SA, multiple rounds of IKEv2 exchange can lead to poten-
tial delay to complete mobility signaling. The AAA operation involved in both two
phases is to enable authentication and authorization of each entity, while the AAA
related database processing and request/response messages add latency to the han-
dover completion time. For data integrity and confidentiality, encryption/decryption
supports the safe transport of authentication and mobility management messages,
but such operations can add up latency of handover. Meanwhile, the choice of al-
gorithm and key length exerts huge impact on the security processing time. For in-
stance, compared with symmetric key mechanisms, the public key methods consume
more energy and require more time for computation [PK04]. Because cryptographic
and authentication schemes rely on the secret keys, key management operations are
essential to the handover security. Nevertheless, the time needed to generate, de-
rive, and further distribute secret keys to corresponding entities prolongs the overall
handover completion time.
Secondly, the negative impact on throughput comes mainly from the latency induced
by handover security schemes. Because many existing transport protocols such as
TCP will slow down the transmission rate while encountering excessive latency and
potential packet losses that exceed the threshold, the reduced sending rate hence
brings down the overall throughput for data transmission.
Thirdly, frequent handovers can generate a huge amount of security related traffic
that take up the bandwidth reserved for data transmission, thus affecting both the
throughput and the quality of service. In addition, as handover security schemes
involve security policy and agreement among different networks, this complexity
results in difficulty to guarantee a stable level of QoS for mobile services.
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Concerning the latency introduced by handover security schemes, one major cause
comes from the security related message exchange between the mobile node and
its home network. In practice, the distance between the home network and the
visiting network where MN currently locates could be far enough to generate huge
propagation delay that can affect performance and user experience, especially for
delay-sensitive applications such as VoIP. In addition, the possibility of packet loss
could increse due to the long distance transmission across various domains. This can
prolong the overall handover completion time due to the need of re-negotiation and
retransmission of lost packets. Besides the propagation delay, mutual authentication
and SA set up both require multiple rounds of message exchange that need to reach
the home network, possibly crossing the Internet. The time required by processing
and transmitting such messages contributes further to the latency and puts off the
handover completion time.
Besides the performance aspects discussed, it should be noted that the impact of
handover security can vary in different scenarios. When a handover occurs with
an on-going communication session, e.g. VoIP call, the latency requirement is more
critical, which requires the security schemes such as authentication and key manage-
ment to minimize their overhead and negative effects on performance. Meanwhile,
if there is no on-going session during a handover, the performance requirement in
terms of latency is less critical, with more flexibility for security operations.
5 Securing Handover in Local Administrative Domain
In mobile and wireless networks, handover is a complex process that involves multi-
ple layers of protocol and security executions. Nowadays, a great challenge faced by
handover comes from the overhead of security implementations that affects perfor-
mance. By studying the impacts of handover security, we propose our approach to
seek a balance between handover security and performance in the security enhanced
Local Administrative Domain (LAD).
5.1 Local administrative domain
According to our analysis of security impact, the lengthy delay introduced by se-
curity schemes constitutes a major part of performance degradation in handover.
Besides the latency factor, authentication and SA negotiation bring communication
67
overhead to the Internet in terms of signaling traffic. In addition, security related
computations entail extra energy consumption and hence poses a huge challenge to
existing mobile terminals with limited power supply and computing capability.
Given the existing challenges, careful investigation and design are needed in order to
make a handover both secure and seamless. Taking into account the heterogeneity of
access technologies and security policies in current networks, we propose the Local
Administrative Domain (LAD) with localized optimization as our approach to seek
a balance between handover security and performance in a well defined security
enhanced domain.
As depicted in Figure 26, an LAD in our proposal is defined as an access domain
consisting of a collection of sub-nets, network entities, and AAA databases under
a common administration. The network entities operating under such administra-
tion can be assumed to share administratively created trust. Optimization can be
implemented in the domain to enhance the performance and handover security.
















Figure 26: Handover Scenario in Local Administrative Domain.
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leaves its home network and enters a LAD, handover occurs and is handled by the
responsible entities in this local domain. When the mobile node changes its access
point within the LAD, localized handover schemes will be used to guarantee a good
level of security and performance.
At the moment, various standard development organizations (SDO) are working
cooperatively to improve the handover security performance from different perspec-
tives. Concerning IP mobility, Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP) improves the global mobility
scheme by limiting the mobility management within the PMIP domain. By utilizing
network-controlled handover method, PMIP can alleviate the overhead of mobility
management signaling conducted over the wireless air link [G+08, LYC08, LF08].
For AAA operation, the hierarchical AAA approach is proposed to reduce the cost
coming from remote authentication and hence improves the overall performance of
handover [W+08].
Based on EAP framework, the IETF HOKEY group [HOK09] focuses on the lo-
calized re-authentication approach to eliminate the latency resulting from multiple
rounds of authentication exchange between a mobile node and its home network with
key distribution supports. The approach for root key derivation from Extended Mas-
ter Session Key (EMSK) is proposed to enable the usage of domain-specific root key
within specific key management domains [S+08]. In order to avoid repetition of full
EAP exchange for frequent mobility with less computational overhead, EAP-AKA
provides a solution to handle re-authentication when a mobile node changes its ac-
cess authenticator [AH06]. The lately proposed EAP Re-authentication Protocol
(ERP) defines an EAP based method-independent re-authentication scheme with
keying hierarchy to support efficient local authentication [ND08].
To compare three EAP based authentication mechanisms, a typical access authenti-
cation scenario is depicted in Figure 27, in which four major entities are presented:
mobile node, authenticator, EAP/ERP local server, and EAP/ERP home server. In
this scenario, full authentication takes place between the mobile node and its home
server, which requires the local server to communicate with the home server to finish
EAP-AKA authentication. The fast re-authentication occurs when the mobile node
changes its authenticator in the LAD. Both EAP-AKA and ERP are able to com-
plete re-authentication without involving the home server. As shown in Figure 27,
compared with EAP-AKA re-authentication, ERP requires only 1 round-trip time
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Figure 27: EAP-AKA and ERP re-authentication signalling [AH06, ND08].
Previous work to improve the performance of handover security forms a solid base
for future design and development. However, as each solution targets at a specific
part of handover security, there is a lack of comprehensive view that is supported
by use case to utilize the existing mechanisms in a coherent manner.
Based on the two-phase handover security model, we integrate the following solutions
to our proposed local administrative domain: First, for secure connectivity, EAP-
AKA is used as the base to support mutual authentication and key management for
access control, owing to its advantage of reusing 3G infrastructure. For scalability
and performance, ERP protocol with its method-independent feature is adopted
as the fast re-authentication mechanism for access authenticaiton to incorporate
multiple authentication methods. Local EAP/AAA servers are used in the LAD to
assist localized AAA operations. Second, for secure reachability, Proxy Mobile IP is
adopted as the main solution to support wireless IP mobility. IKEv2 and IPsec are
used for SA set up and cryptographic operations to protect mobility management
signaling. For AAA operation, both RADIUS and DIAMETER are candidates to
enable AAA functionality for interoperability and scalability concerns.
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By utilizing solutions provided by SDOs, our proposal renders the following advan-
tages: 1) by conducting access authentication and AAA operation within the LAD,
the frequent security signaling across the Internet can be avoided, which can greatly
reduce the propagation delay hence shortening the authentication completion time;
2) by using EAP-AKA and ERP re-authentication mechanism, less security signal-
ing is needed, thus promoting the bandwidth usage of both wired and wireless links;
3) as EAP-AKA adopts symmetric key, less computation time is needed for authen-
tication and key derivation, hence reducing the authentication and saving energy
on the mobile terminal; 4) ERP provides a method-independent generic framework
to support efficient re-authentication and distribution of EAP keying materials; 5)
Proxy Mobile IP enables the mobility management without the involvement of mo-
bile terminals, which greatly reduces the energy consumed by transmitting security
and mobility related signaling over the wireless link; 6) the local AAA operation
with key management enables the fast authentication and authorization procedure,
which helps shorten the overall handover completion time.
It should be noticed that the cross-vendor security agreement is not concerned in
our proposal at current phase, since such agreement involves commercial and social
complexity and requires careful investigation and analysis. Our proposal of Local
Administrative Domain targets at the existing handover security solutions and seeks
a balance between security and performance in such a security enhanced multi-
access domain. By enabling handover with satisfactory performance and security
guarantee, our proposal offers a flexible and extensible structure open to future
improvement and upgrade.
5.2 Performance evaluation
To analyze handover performance using the security schemes proposed in Local Ad-
ministrative Domain (LAD), we implement two EAP based access authentication
protocols, EAP-AKA and ERP [AH06, ALE09, ND08], in a simulation environment -
the Network Simulator version 2 (ns-2) [NS 08]. Based on the security impact analy-
sis, our experimentation reflects the performance improvement in secure connectivity
phase, which yields a positive impact on the overall performance of handover.
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5.2.1 Objective and methods
The main goal of our test is to evaluate the performance improvement gaining from
the handover security schemes adopted in our proposal, the Local Administrative
Domain (LAD). Our focus is on the access authentication latency given its criti-
cal impact on overall handover performance [AW07]. As our first step to achieve a
balance between handover performance and security, we aim at promoting the un-
derstanding of how to make a handover in wireless mobile environment both secure
and seamless.
As defined in our 2-Phase model, access authentication occurs in the secure connec-
tivity phase. Given a typical roaming scenario when a mobile node is moving to a
foreign domain, the full authentication messages often need to be transmitted to the
home network over the Internet. Due to the long distance between foreign domain
and home domain, the lengthy propagation delay and potential packet loss can cause
performance degradation. As we adopt EAP-AKA and ERP in our proposed LAD,
both protocols provide efficient localized re-authentication mechanisms to avoid ex-
cessive latency from frequent full authentications across the Internet. The localized
optimization in LAD shortens the handover completion time, and hence leads to
better handover performance.
To test the efficiency of fast re-authentication, we implement both EAP-AKA and
ERP protocols in ns-2 and conduct performance tests covering two handover sce-
narios, as depicted in Figure 28. In scenario 1, handover occurs in the home domain
with a base network topology including mobile node, access points, and EAP/ERP
server. Scenario 2 covers the handover in a foreign LAD where full authentication
messages are handled by home EAP/ERP server while localized re-authentication
is handled by the local EAP/ERP server residing in the LAD.
In order to obtain results containing statistical significance, we conduct simulation
test with 100 repetitions for each scenario under different parameters such as link
bandwidth and Internet latency. By comparing the re-authentication of both EAP-
AKA and ERP with the full authentication which is performed at connection set up

























Figure 28: Test scenarios.
5.2.2 Simulation platform and protocol implementation
The simulation platform we use for testing and protocol implementation is the Net-
work Simulator version 2 (ns-2). With the latest released version 2.34, ns-2 is an
object-oriented and event driven network simulator developed in C++ and Object-
oriented Tcl (OTcl) [OTc09]. Owing to its open and extensible architecture, ns-2 is
currently used by numerous research projects as simulation platform for wired and
wireless IP networks covering a wide range of protocols [NS 08].
In ns-2, different networking protocols are implemented as ns-2 network component
objects such as ns agents and ns applications. An agent in ns-2 is a network object
responsible for data transfer e.g. a TCP agent and UDP agent. On the other hand,
an application in ns-2 is responsible for generating data traffic, e.g. a Telnet appli-
cation and FTP application. Most of the existing protocols in ns-2 are implemented
in C++ to achieve satisfactory execution performance. At the same time, in order
to offer a convenient interface for ns-2 users to set up network topology and run
simulation tests, ns-2 adopts OTcl script interpreter and network set up modules.
73
As an event driven simulator, ns-2 deploys the event scheduler to manipulate events.
For ns-2, an event contains a scheduling time, a unique packet identification, and
an pointer to a event handler. Each ns-2 packet identified by its event ID is thus
associated with a scheduling time with one pointer to an object that handles the
event. The ns-2 event scheduler is responsible for keeping track of simulation time
and scheduling events in the event queue. When the scheduled time for an event
arrives, the event scheduler will invoke appropriate network components pointed by
this event to fulfil corresponding operations.
In order to control network components coded in C++, ns-2 uses the OTcl linkage
to build a connection between C++ objects and corresponding OTcl objects. The
linkage concept in ns-2 is illustrated in Figure 29 together with a general view of ns-2
simulation. Because OTcl linkage matches each C++ object with its OTcl object,
OTcl interpreter can handle and control network objects compiled in C++ via the
linkage. This linkage feature in ns-2 offers not only a clear interface to its users, but
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Figure 29: OTcl linkage and ns-2 overview. [CC09]
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As shown in Figure 29 for a general view of ns-2 simulation, the OTcl script language
and OTcl interpreter together provide a fast prototyping feature for ns-2 users to
set up simulation test. By linking various ns objects and libraries to form a co-
herent framework, ns-2 can generate simulation results according to users’ will and
requirement. In addition, ns-2 regulates and forms the simulation results in a proper
format ready for data analysis.
In order to support protocol implementation, ns-2 defines its own packet format
which consists of a stack of headers and optional data space. The header stack
in a packet contains all registered headers such as IP header, TCP header, trace
header, and headers added by developers. The optional data space is used by ns-2
application for data traffic. Each header contains protocol specific information fields
and can be accessed by network objects such as ns-2 agent using the corresponding
offset value.
Our implementation for access authentication protocols in ns-2 consists of two major
parts: a new packet header containing protocol related information, and a new agent
class defining protocol specific operations. The format of new header and protocol






































ns-2 packet format Protocol operation 
EAP request : ID
EAP response : ID
EAP request :  AKA Challenge
EAP response : AKA Challenge
EAP Success or Failure
ERP Initiate : Start
ERP Initiate : Re-authentication
ERP Finish : Re-authentication
Figure 30: Packet format and protocol operation.
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First, we create a new header containing EAP related information. The new header
is registered in ns-2 with an pre-defined offset, so that ns-2 agent can access this
header to manipulate protocol fields. As shown in Figure 30, we define four EAP
fields in our new header: Code, Type, Identifier, and ERP Result.
In our new header, the Code field is used to identify the type of each EAP packet
with six types of values: value 1 represents EAP Request; value 2 represents EAP
Response; value 3 represents EAP Success; value 4 represents EAP Failure; value
5 represents ERP Init; and value 6 represents ERP Finish. The Type field is used
to indicate the EAP method information with four types of values: value 1 repre-
sents the EAP-AKA Identity; value 2 represents the EAP-AKA Challenge; value 3
represents the ERP Start; and value 4 represents the ERP Re-authentication. The
Identifier field is used to synchronize the behavior of sender and receiver by requir-
ing that the Identifier of EAP Request must match the current outstanding EAP
Response. The ERP Result field is used to indicate the re-authentication result of
an ERP exchange.
Second, based on the header format we implement a new ns-2 agent to transfer
authentication packets following the protocol specifications [A+04, AH06, ALE09,
ND08]. As illustrated in Figure 30, both EAP-AKA and ERP protocols are imple-
mented in our agent.
For EAP-AKA protocol, the message flow of re-authentication is the same as the
full authentication. The difference between EAP-AKA re-authentication and full au-
thentication is illustrated by the handover scenario in LAD, since the re-authentication
is handled by local server in LAD, while the full authentication needs to be handled
by the home server in the home domain. Upon receiving authentication packet,
the agent will check the values contained in each EAP header field, make necessary
modifications, and send out packet according to the evaluation.
For ERP protocol, we implement the complete ERP re-authentication procedure in
which the server side starts the ERP Init with Type field set as ERP start. Following
the ERP protocol specification, three authentication messages are needed to fulfil
re-authentication, including the ERP Init - Start message to initiate ERP exchange,
and two following messages ERP Init and ERP Finish for re-authentication.
Because our new EAP agent is implemented in C++ as a network object, we use
OTcl linkage to bind this object to its corresponding OTcl object, so that ns-2 users
can call the agent using OTcl script via the OTcl interpreter. For testing, we also
link the network parameters such as propagation delay and packet size to the OTcl
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space to enable dynamic parameter change on demand.
Concerning the cryptographic operations involvded in key management and AAA
operation that are carried out by our agent, we adopt an indirect way for implemen-
tation. The computation time for such cryptographic operations are emulated by
adding a delay to the agent on the processing of corresponding messages. By doing
this, we reveal the computation latency involved in those operations and logically
combine them into our protocol operations.
It should be noticed that our implementations of EAP-AKA and ERP protocols are
slightly modified to conform to the design requirement of ns-2 extension. Therefore
we do not cover all the features and scenarios specified in the protocol specifica-
tions [AH06, ALE09, ND08]. For instance, retransmission and fall-back behavior
are not included in the current agent implementation. The reason for our simplified
protocol implementation is that we aim at obtaining direct and priliminary results
as the first step. Due to the time limit and implementation consideration, protocol
features that are not included in current version will be added to the future imple-
mentation. Nevertheless, our implementation contains the essential parts required
by each access authentication scheme. By covering such key features, our ns-2 im-
plementations are capable of reflecting correct protocol behavior in the simulation
environment.
5.3 Test arrangement
To measure the authentication latency of three target EAP based schemes, EAP-
AKA full authentication, EAP-AKA re-authentication, and ERP re-authentication,
we set up a test environment in ns-2 version 2.34 [NS 08] with our EAP/ERP agent
and packet header deployed on corresponding entities. The network topology for our
simulation is illustrated in Figure 31. As shown in the figure, our test covers two
major scenarios. As discussed in Section 5.2.1, scenario 1 targets at performance
evaluation of three access authentication schemes in the home domain by comparing
the latency values obtained from each scheme. Scenario 2 is to test the performance
improvement for handover security in LAD by comparing the EAP-AKA full au-
thentication with other two localized authentication schemes.
In scenario 1, three types of entities form the test network: one mobile node (MN),
two authenticators functioning as access points for the MN, and one EAP/ERP
























5 Mbps, 10 ms
UMTS
384 kbps, 300 
ms
Ethernet
10 Mbps, 5 ms
Ethernet
10 Mbps, 5 ms
WLAN
5 Mbps, 10 ms
UMTS
384 kbps, 300 
Ethernet
10 Mbps, 5 ms
Ethernet
10 Mbps, 5 ms





Figure 31: Network topology for performance test.
MN and server to fullfil authentication process following the protocol specifications.
From mobile node to authenticators, two types of access links are simulated for
wireless connectivity. The transmission rate for WLAN link is set to 5 Mbps with
10 ms as propagation delay. For UMTS link the rate is set to 384 kbps with 300 ms as
propagation delay. Between authenticators and EAP/ERP server, wired connections
are simulated as ethernet links with 10 Mbps transmission rate and 5 ms propagation
delay.
Scenario 2 consists of two domains: the home domain with one EAP/ERP server and
the LAD containing one MN, two authenticators, and one local EAP/ERP server.
The characteristics of links inside LAD follow the same setting as used in scenario 1.
As shown in Figure 31, the LAD domain and home domain are separated by the IP
based Internet connection. For EAP-AKA full authentication, each message needs
to be transferred between the local server and home server across the Internet. To
simulate the impact of Internet connection, we assign the link latency with a series
of selected values ranging from 10 ms to 300 ms.
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Because the Internet latency parameter plays a critical role in the test, the values
selected for our simulation need to reflect the condition in real networking environ-
ment. As an example, assuming the home domain for a mobile node is in Helsinki
while the mobile node is handovered to a LAD in France at the moment, this mobile
node needs to conduct full authentication acrossing the Internet between France
and Helsinki in order to obtain access right to the visiting network. In this example,
re-authentication schemes require only authentication exchange within such LAD
in France. To make our simulation realistic, we obtain 6 sets of values from the
real network by running the PING program provided by Linux operating system
(kernel version 2.6.27) to probe 6 different locations with physical distance variance.
The values collected are summarized in Table 1 containing four fields: location,
round-trip time (RTT), mean deviation, and selected probing sites.
For each latency value presented in the table, we run the probing test with 100
repetitions. Each time the PING program sends 50 ICMP Echo Requests to the
corresponding destination with message size equal to the EAP-AKA full authen-
tication message. The probing test is done at Department of Computer Science,
University of Helsinki. As shown in the table, the target destinations cover 2 Eu-
ropean cities (Uppsala, Sophia Antipolis), 2 American cities (New York, Stanford),
and 2 Asian cities (Beijing, Tokyo). The choice of locations exhibits diversity of
distance, which yields a good coverage for latency values. The set of ’Mean RTT’
values in Table 1 are used in our test as the link latency parameter to simulate the
Internet latency.
Concerning another key parameter in our test, the AAA related cryptographic com-
putation time required by key management and AAA operations, we assign a delay
value to our EAP/ERP agent during its processing of authentication messages to
Table 1: Internet latency probing results
Location Mean RTT(ms)Mean Deviation(ms)Probing Site
Uppsala, Sweden 9.99 0.29 www.uu.se
Sophia Antipolis, France 58.20 0.30 www-sop.inria.fr
New York, U.S.A. 114.53 0.35 www1.cs.columbia.edu
Stanford, U.S.A. 206.66 0.66 www-cs.stanford.edu
Beijing, China 197.97 0.73 www.tsinghua.edu.cn
Tokyo, Japan 306.51 0.81 www.u-tokyo.ac.jp
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simulate this computation effect. Considering the load variation on AAA server in
real environment, we select the ns-2 random number generator to obtain a series of
independent delay values for our test. Based on previous research [K+06, Kor08,
I+08], the value for EAP-AKA full authentication is generated under exponential
distribution with 500 ms as the mean value, ranging from 200 ms to 9000 ms. The
value for re-authenticaiton schemes is generated under exponential distribution with
300 ms as the mean value, ranging from 45 ms to 9000 ms. Following such setting,
we generate 100 independent random numbers for EAP-AKA full authentication
and use them as the input of Internet latency parameter in each test repetition. In
order to compare the performance between EAP-AKA re-authentication and ERP
re-authentication, we choose to generate 100 independent random numbers and use
the same number set for both schemes in our measurement.
For the size of authentication message in our simulation, given that the crypto-
graphic keys used by authentication schemes vary in different scenarios according
to security level and system requirement, we select 178 bytes as the mean value for
EAP-AKA messages and 132 bytes for ERP messages [PK04, ND08].
The performance metric we measure is the authentication latency, which is calcu-
lated as the time between the start of first authentication message and the receival
of the final authentication message. Since our test does not cover retransmission
behavior, we simulate all the connections as error free links in order to obtain direct
values of authentication latency.
Following the test design, we measure the authentication latency in our simulation
environment for three access authentication schemes based on the protocol behavior
illustrated in Figure 30. For scenario 1, we allocate the EAP/ERP agents on mobile
node and home server to exchange authentication messages. The full authentication
and re-authentication in scenario 1 involve mobile node, authenticator, and home
server. Our test covers three authentication schemes conducted over two types of
wireless access technologies - UMTS and WLAN, thus yielding two test categories
in scenario 1.
For scenario 2, the full EAP-AKA authentication involves the mobile node, authen-
ticator, and the home EAP/ERP server across the simulated Internet connection,
while the re-authentication is handled by the local EAP/ERP server within the
LAD. We therefore allocate two pairs of agents on the corresponding entities, with
one pair connecting the mobile node and the home EAP/ERP server and another
pair connecting the mobile node and the local EAP/ERP server. The test in sce-
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nario 2 covers two types of wireless access technologies and six different values for
Internet latency. For Internet latency, we adopt the ’Mean RTT’ values from Table
1 as the link latency in test. Three authentication schemes are tested against twelve
cases, with 6 cases for UMTS access and 6 for WLAN access, respectively.
All the test cases in both scenarios are repeated over 100 times by taking the afore-
mentioned random number as the input for AAA related computation latency on
each repetition. In each test case, one type of authentication scheme is simulated
which involves message exchange between the mobile node and the EAP/ERP server
to complete access authentication. The ns-2 simulator keeps track of the essential
networking events and records them into the trace file for further performance anal-
ysis.
5.4 Test results
Based on the analysis of trace files generated by ns-2, we obtain a series of measure-
ment results on authentication latency according to our test arrangement for two
scenarios. Since the test setting of scenario 1 is different from that of scenario 2, we
discuss and analyze two scenarios separately.
For scenario 1, we focus on the performance comparison of three authentication
schemes occurring in the home domain. The simulation results are summarized in
Table 2, covering two categories for UMTS access and WLAN access, representing
the slow link with 300 ms delay and the fast link with 10 ms delay, respectively. We
provide four fields in the table to compare different aspects for each scheme.
The ’Total Latency’ field shows the mean time required to complete the authentica-
tion associated with a standard deviation obtained from 100 test repetitions. As the
value in ’Total Latency’ includes two parts, the transmission time for authentication
messages and the time spent on AAA related cryptographic computations, we pro-
vide two fields to indicate the percentage of each part in the total latency. The ’RTT
% of Total’ shows the percentage of transmission time required for authentication
messages against the total latency. The value of ’RTT % of Total’ is calculated
by dividing the transmission time to the mean value of corresponding total latency
in each case. At the same time, the ’AAA % of Total’ shows the percentage of
time spent on AAA related computations in the total latency, which is obtained by
subtracting the value of ’RTT % of Total’ by 1. The ’No. of Msg’ shows the total
number of messages required to complete each authentication scheme.
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From the values in ’Total Latency’ for scenario 1, we can tell that the performance
of ERP protocol is better than EAP-AKA re-authentication and full authentication.
This performance improvement comes mainly from two parts: 1) ERP requires only
three messages to complete authentication, compared to the five messages required
by other two schemes; 2) the re-authentication requires less time to finish the AAA
related computation. For both UMTS and WLAN, the authentication latency of
ERP is at least 40% less than that of EAP-AKA full authentication. Compared with
EAP-AKA re-authentication, ERP requires 30% less authentication time in UMTS
access, and for WLAN access it requires 10% less time.
Since in scenario 1 all the authentication messages are handled inside the home
domain, the propagation delay from wireless access exerts a huge impact on authen-
tication. As shown in Table 2, the total latency values in the UMTS category are
much higher than the ones in WLAN access for all three types of authentication
schemes. This impact is also reflected in the RTT percentage field. For the UMTS
access which has longer propagation delay than the WLAN access, the RTT required
to exchange authentication messages takes a large portion of total latency, with the
highest value up to 81.7% under the EAP-AKA re-authentication. On the other
hand, the effect of AAA related computation is obvious in the WLAN case, with
the AAA percentage value above 80% for all three schemes. This implication is due
to that in WLAN case less time is required for message exchange.
As aforementioned, in order to compare the performance of EAP-AKA re-authentication
and ERP re-authentication, we use the same set of random numbers as AAA latency
Table 2: Test results of scenario 1
UMTS access
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 2215.72 ± 448.88 69.7 30.3 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 1889.31 ± 281.21 81.7 18.3 5
ERP re-auth. 1266.60 ± 281.48 72.9 27.1 3
WLAN access
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 748.59 ± 448.24 10.3 89.7 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 422.40 ± 281.47 18.3 81.7 5
ERP re-auth. 388.81 ± 280.98 11.8 88.2 3
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parameter for both schemes. This is reflected in our results as the standard devia-
tion of total latency for both schemes are very close and fall in the range between
280 ms to 282 ms.
In scenario 2, we target at comparing the performance of localized authentication
schemes adopted in LAD against the EAP-AKA full authentication. Given our
test design, we divide the measurement results into two main categories in terms
of wireless access. For each category, six test cases are covered using six different
Internet latency values. We adopt both figures and tables to assist our analysis, with
the figures conveying the authentication latency of three schemes under different
Internet latency values, and the tables summarizing the measurement results using
the same fields as in Table 2.
Concerning the category of UMTS access, we present the results in Figure 32 and
Table 3 covering six cases. For performance comparison, the diagram in Figure 32
depicts the mean values of total authentication time required for each authentication
mechanism under six different Internet latency parameters. As shown in the figure,
ERP re-authentication yields better performance than both EAP-AKA full authenti-





























Figure 32: Test results of scenario 2, UMTS access.
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Table 3: Test results of scenario 2, UMTS access
Case 1: 10 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 2240.23 ± 448.61 70.0 30.0 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 1889.90 ± 281.92 81.7 18.3 5
ERP re-auth. 1266.59 ± 281.40 72.9 27.1 3
Case 2: 58 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 2360.66 ± 448.45 71.6 28.4 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 1890.09 ± 281.30 81.7 18.3 5
ERP re-auth. 1266.47 ± 281.43 72.9 27.1 3
Case 3: 115 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 2501.54 ± 448.75 73.2 26.8 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 1890.09 ± 280.92 81.7 18.3 5
ERP re-auth. 1266.54 ± 281.15 72.9 27.1 3
Case 4: 198 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 2710.15 ± 448.57 75.2 24.8 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 1889.82 ± 281.38 81.7 18.3 5
ERP re-auth. 1266.71 ± 281.48 72.9 27.1 3
Case 5: 207 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 2731.97 ± 448.42 75.4 24.6 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 1890.10 ± 281.19 81.7 18.3 5
ERP re-auth. 1266.64 ± 281.41 72.9 27.1 3
Case 6: 307 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 2981.86 ± 448.33 77.5 22.5 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 1889.53 ± 281.49 81.7 18.3 5
ERP re-auth. 1266.71 ± 281.48 72.9 27.1 3
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Because full authentication requires communication with the home domain across
the Internet, the total latency for EAP-AKA full authentication grows along with
the augment of Internet latency. As re-authentication schemes are handled locally,
their latency measurement results are not affected by the Internet delay parameter
compared with full authentication. Comparing two re-authentication schemes from
EAP-AKA and ERP, since ERP requires less messages to complete its authentica-
tion, under the slow access link such as UMTS, the latency value for ERP is 30%
less than that of EAP-AKA re-authentication.
From Table 3, we observe a steady increase in the ’RTT % of Total’ for EAP-AKA
full authentication from case 1 to case 6 with the highest value up to 77.5 % in the
total letency. Due to the long propagation delay over wireless link in this category,
the ’RTT % of Total’ values are high for all three schemes with the highest value
achieved by EAP-AKA re-authentication as 81.7 %. Because the time required to
exchange authentication message takes long under slow wireless link, the ’AAA %
of Total’ constitutes a smaller portion of total latency in this category.
Concerning the WLAN access, we present our measurements in Figure 33 and Table





























Figure 33: Test results of scenario 2, WLAN access.
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Table 4: Test results of scenario 2, WLAN access
Case 1: 10 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 772.98 ± 448.35 13.2 86.8 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 422.34 ± 281.15 18.3 81.7 5
ERP re-auth. 388.95 ± 281.35 11.8 88.2 3
Case 2: 58 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 893.71 ± 448.16 24.9 75.1 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 422.45 ± 281.33 18.3 81.7 5
ERP re-auth. 388.81 ± 281.35 11.8 88.2 3
Case 3: 115 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 1034.05 ± 448.72 35.1 64.9 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 422.67 ± 280.82 18.3 81.7 5
ERP re-auth. 389.53 ± 281.41 11.8 88.2 3
Case 4: 198 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 1243.20 ± 448.76 46.0 54.0 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 423.22 ± 280.91 18.3 81.7 5
ERP re-auth. 388.90 ± 281.57 11.8 88.2 3
Case 5: 207 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 1264.89 ± 448.67 46.9 53.1 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 422.72 ± 281.01 18.3 81.7 5
ERP re-auth. 389.19 ± 281.45 11.8 88.2 3
Case 6: 307 ms latency
Auth. Type Total Latency(ms)RTT % of Total AAA % of Total No. of Msg
EAP-AKA full 1514.83 ± 448.80 55.7 44.3 5
EAP-AKA re-auth. 422.36 ± 281.27 18.3 81.7 5
ERP re-auth. 388.90 ± 281.42 11.8 88.2 3
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ERP is better than EAP-AKA full authentication and re-authentication. Another
interesting observation is that with fast access link, the performce of EAP-AKA
re-authentication is very close to that of ERP. This mainly comes from the fact
that both two schemes adopt the localized approach for authentication, and the
tranmission delay in this case is comparably insignificant to the total latency. This
can be observed also by comparing the diagrams in Figure 3 and 4 that the latency
gap between ERP and EAP-AKA re-authentication in UMTS case is wider than
that in WLAN case. Since EAP-AKA re-authentication requires two more messages
to complete the authentication than ERP, under slow link access such as UMTS,
the effect of long propagation delay is obvious to prolong the total latency.
As shown in Table 4, the Internet latency has huge impact on the total authentication
time for full authentication scheme, with the ’Total Latency’ value growing from
772.98 ms to 1514.83 ms regarding to case 1 and case 6, respectively. This effect
is also indicated in the ’RTT % Total’ field, as the value increases from 13.2% to
55.7% for full authentication. Another observation from the table is that under fast
wireless access, the time required for AAA related computation occupies a large part
of total latency, with the highest value up to 88.2% for ERP scheme.
It should be noticed that in order to compare three schemes across different scenarios,
we apply the same set of random numbers generated by ns-2 to each authentication
scheme for all 12 test cases. This ensures that the values for AAA related com-
putation latency follow the same distribution in different scenarios for each scheme
and enables us to compare the performance of each scheme under different test
parameters such as the Internet latency.
In summary, the localized mechanisms yield better performance comparing to the
counterpart without localized optimization for access authentication as expected.
The performance of access authentication depends on three major factors includ-
ing the characteristics of access links, the Internet latency, and the AAA related
computation time.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In wireless and mobile networks, handover security enables the protection of in-
tegrity, confidentiality, and availability of user credentials and network resources
during a handover. The security impact from authentication, key management, and
cryptographic operations affects the handover performance.
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To understand the interaction between performance and handover security, we di-
vide the process of handover security into two phases supported by our in-depth
analysis on trust relationships and performance aspects that are affected by existing
security schemes. As an attempt to seek a balance between handover security and
performance, we propose the local administrative domain with localized security
optimization to promote handover performance.
In summary, the contributions of this thesis include the 2-Phase model for han-
dover security, the design of local administrative domain, and our protocol imple-
mentations in ns-2 for performance measurement. Because handover security is a
challenging topic, our analysis on the impact of handover security is hence valu-
able as a guideline to promote our understanding and shed lights on the design and
development of future handover security schemes.
As our first step to understand the security impact on handover, we measure and
compare the performance of different access authentication schemes occurring in the
secure connectivity phase. In the future we plan to extend our work to the secure
mobility phase and implement mobility protocols such as Proxy Mobile IP in ns-2.
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